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Abstract
We study the screening problem of a ﬁrm that needs to hire a worker to produce output and
that observes neither the productive ability nor the intrinsic motivation of the job applicant. We
completely characterize the set of optimal contracts according to whether motivation or ability is the
main determinant of the worker’s performance. We show that it is always in the ﬁrm’s interest to
hire all types of worker and to oﬀer diﬀerent contracts to diﬀerent types of employees. Interestingly,
when motivation is very high, incentives force the ﬁrm to pay higher informational rents, to increase
eﬀort distorsions for motivated workers, and to oﬀer a strictly positive wage to workers enjoying a
positive utility from eﬀort provision, who thus become paid volunteers. These results suggest that,
from the principal’s viewpoint, very high motivation might not be a desirable worker’s characteristic.
Jel classiﬁcation: D82, D86, J31, M55.
Key-words: bidimensional screening, self-selection, intrinsic motivation, skills.
1 Introduction
A recent literature addresses the issue of the selection of applicants in a labor market where potential
workers can be intrinsically motivated for the job, as in the market for civil servants, health professionals
and teachers (Handy and Katz 1998, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007, 2010 Francois 2000, Heyes 2005). A
shared view from this literature is that high wages are necessary to attract applicants with high skills,
but this comes at the cost of employing workers who are less motivated for the task to be performed.
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Conversely, low monetary wages select highly motivated workers, who might not necessarily be talented
or skilled. This suggests that ﬁrms are not able to design optimal compensation practices in order to
screen potential applicant according to both productive ability and motivation, despite the fact that the
workers’ overall performance depends on the interplay of both characteristics. We depart from this view
claiming that, in a world where workers’ attributes are not observable, a ﬁrm can succeed in solving this
problem oﬀering simple contracts based on one screening instrument only and a non-linear wage.
Take the market for nurses, where hospitals typically oﬀer contracts characterized by a diﬀerent
number of working hours: in the U.S., part-time contracts require about 24 hours each week, full-time
nurses work an average of about 43 hours a week; moreover nurses can choose paid voluntary overtime
up to a total amount that cannot exceed 60 hours a week.1 As for nurses’ monetary compensation, the
total salary they receive is generally represented by an hourly wage that depends on the number of hours
worked per day: it encompasses part-time penalties and/or overtime premia. We show that such simple
contracts, deﬁned only by the number of hours worked per week and by the total salary, are likely to
enable the hospital to screen applicants with respect to two diﬀerent dimensions of private information,
namely ability and intrinsic motivation. In particular, our model predicts that high-ability motivated
applicants choose the contract with the largest voluntary overtime and low-ability non-motivated nurses
are targeted to part-time contracts.
As is well known, also workers’ career concerns can be used as a screening device. Typically, workers
self-select into diﬀerent career paths: some of them accept tasks involving strong performance evaluation
in exchange for more likely and faster promotions; some others prefer a slower progress up the job ladder
together with lower pay and almost no performance evaluation. In the academia, for instance, junior
professors can either choose tenure-track positions, which require them to demonstrate, within a short
time span, a strong record of published research, grant funding, teaching and administrative service or
positions oﬀ the tenure track (such as lecturer or adjunct professor), which require them to teach full-
or part-time but with few or no research responsibilities. Here an optimal contract consists of the career
path and the overall compensation. Intuitively, tenure-track positions are targeted to attract the best
researchers.
We investigate the problem of the selection of workers whose overall performance results from the
interplay of skills and motivation and we thus contribute to the existing literature by explicitly accounting
for the bidimensional nature of workers’ private information. Indeed, the literature either deals with the
1Bae (2012) presents a quantitative survey data collected from registered nurses who worked in hospitals as staﬀ nurses
in North Carolina and West Virginia in 2010-2011. Concerning overtime, the author shows that 33.2% of nurses working
overtime are choosing to perform voluntary paid overtime; among them, 42% are working overtime more than 12 hours a
week. Interestingly, the survey also considers the reasons reported by nurses as to why they worked overtime. Nearly half
(46.3%) of nurses choosing voluntary overtime declared that they “like to work overtime”.
2
selection of workers who are privately informed about their motivation only (see Heyes 2005 and Delfgaauw
and Dur 2007) or considers asymmetric information on both motivation and skills but does not explicitly
solve the bidimensional screening problem, because the principal is only asked to hire a limited set of
types (see Delfgaauw and Dur 2008). A detailed description of the related literature is provided in a
separate section which follows.
We consider a principal-agent relationship where agents’ skills (or productive ability) and intrinsic
motivation are independently and discretely distributed, and take two possible values. Productive ability
lowers the worker’s cost of providing eﬀort whereas motivation is interpreted as the worker’s enjoyment
of her personal contribution to the ﬁrm’s outcome or as a non-monetary beneﬁt accruing to the worker
when performing a given task. Since worker’s characteristics can not be observed by the employer, they
can not be contracted upon. Instead, we assume that the ﬁrm can observe and verify the eﬀort levels
provided by diﬀerent types of workers. Thus, the employer oﬀers a menu of contracts consisting in
diﬀerent combinations of wage rate and eﬀort provision. Our goal is then to describe the set of optimal
screening contracts and, in particular, to analyze which types of workers are hired and which are the
optimal compensation practices that the ﬁrm adopts.2
The complete characterization of optimal contracts allows us to deliver some novel and interesting
insights. Despite having only one instrument (the observable eﬀort level) at his disposal, the ﬁrm always
oﬀers contracts that entail full separation and full participation of types (whenever they exist) which
dominate menus with pooling or exclusion. Thus, when full separation and full participation of types is
feasible, screening is not too costly for the ﬁrm, neither in terms of information rents that the principal
leaves to the most motivated and/or most able type, nor in terms of distortions of eﬀort levels that
less motivated and/or less able types are required to provide. From this viewpoint, our results stand in
contrast with the literature on multidimensional screening which predicts that bunching and/or exclusion
are inevitable.
As for the optimal wage schemes, under full information, high-ability non-motivated workers are always
paid the highest wage, while motivated low-ability employees are always paid the lowest salary. Under
asymmetric information, however, there is a reversal in the ranking of rewards: high-skilled motivated
workers receive the highest transfer, while low-skilled non motivated worker obtain the lowest reward.
This is because motivated workers are able to mimic non-motivated ones and thus require an information
rent for truthful revelation, which increases their compensation.
Our results are driven by the relative importance of the diﬀerence in motivation vis à vis the diﬀerence
in ability, which inﬂuences the principal’s “preference ordering” over the possible types. High-skilled
motivated workers are unambiguously the best types, since they provide the highest possible level of
2With a slight loss of generality, our analysis could be entirely rephrased in terms of a governmental agency (the principal)
willing to hire a manager (the agent) who might be endowed with public service motivation.
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eﬀort and contribute the most to output production, low-skilled non-motivated employees are the worst
types, while there is no natural ranking of intermediate types. Accordingly, there are two possible states
of the world to be studied. The ﬁrst one is characterized by heterogeneity in motivation prevailing over
heterogeneity in ability (meaning that motivation has a larger impact than ability on the worker’s eﬀort
provision and on the ﬁrm’s output), in which case the low-ability motivated worker is asked to provide a
higher eﬀort than the high-ability non-motivated type. The second is characterized by heterogeneity in
ability being more signiﬁcant than heterogeneity in motivation (meaning that ability contributes relatively
more to eﬀort provision) so that high-skilled non-motivated workers are induced to exert higher eﬀort
than low-skilled motivated ones.
When motivation has a larger impact than ability on eﬀort provision, we obtain an intriguing result:
for intermediate types, wages might not increase monotonically in eﬀort provision, in which case low-
skilled motivated workers become “paid volunteers” at the optimal contract, because they always earn
a strictly positive salary (given the information rents that they receive) even if they enjoy a net utility
from eﬀort provision.
Conversely, when ability has a larger impact than motivation on eﬀort provision, but vocation is still
high, a tension realizes: on the one hand, at any optimal contract, the high-skilled non-motivated worker
is required to provide a higher eﬀort than the low-skilled motivated one; on the other hand, as motivation
increases, the motivated worker faces a diminishing disutility of eﬀort so that it becomes more and more
convenient to increase her eﬀort and more and more diﬃcult to meet the previous monotonicity condition.
This tension generates a counter-intuitive pattern of binding incentive compatibility constraints and leads
to the most interesting classes of solutions where: (i) the rents paid by the principal to the diﬀerent types
of workers are lower than in the case in which motivation prevails, (ii) there is no distortion in the
eﬀort provided by low-skilled motivated workers, together with the standard result of no distortion at
the top. In this situation, we ﬁnd that, although wages increase monotonically in eﬀort levels, indirect
utilities (i.e. information rents) are monotonically decreasing in eﬀort for intermediate types. Hence,
low-skilled motivated workers exert a lower eﬀort, gain a lower salary but are more satisﬁed than skilled,
non motivated types.
To conclude, we obtain an unexpected result: when motivation is very high, all worker types receive
higher informational rents and the low-skilled motivated worker might become a “paid volunteer”, while
she provides an eﬀort level which is not distorted at the solutions obtained when motivation is lower.
This suggests that, from the principal’s viewpoint, very high motivation might not be a desirable worker’s
characteristic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following Subsection we describe the related
literature. In Section 2, we set up the model. Section 3 describes the benchmark cases, starting with
the ﬁrst-best (Section 3.1) and considering then asymmetric information on one dimension only, be it
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ability (Section 3.2) or intrinsic motivation (Section 3.3). In Section 4, we consider the interaction
between the two sources of incomplete information. We distinguish between the two polar cases in
which: (i) motivation has a larger impact than ability on eﬀort provision, or (ii) ability has a larger
impact than motivation on eﬀort provision. We describe the set of optimal contracts focusing on their
qualitative features. Section 5 considers more in detail the two most signiﬁcant optimal contracts with
full separation and full participation of types and oﬀers some interesting comparisons between them. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix as well as the formal analysis of bunching and/or exclusion. Section
6 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
Our work contributes to two diﬀerent strands of literature: from an economic point of view, it adds to
the recent and rapidly growing literature on the selection of workers with intrinsic motivation; from a
technical point of view, it explicitly solves the principal-agent problem in a labor market where workers
are characterized by two diﬀerent dimensions of private information.
The problem of the design of optimal incentive schemes for intrinsically motivated workers has been
tackled by Murdock (2002), Besley and Gathak (2005) and Ghatak and Mueller (2011), whose attention
has primarily been devoted to moral hazard, while we consider the screening problem.
Heyes (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) are the ﬁrst papers that address the issue of the selection
of workers who are privately informed about their vocation. They show that, as a worker’s motivation
increases, the worker’s reservation wage decreases. Therefore, as the wage increases, the average moti-
vation of the workers who are willing to accept the job deteriorates. Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) use a
directed search framework à la Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides and they show that optimal wage
schemes entail a trade-oﬀ between the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, the rents left to the workers and
the expected motivation of job applicants. Our analysis departs from this work because it includes a
second source of asymmetric information (productive ability) and, most importantly, because it resorts
to a direct revelation mechanism allowing the principal to infer the workers’ true types.
Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) consider a richer framework where workers are heterogeneous with respect
to both their intrinsic motivation and their ability. They focus on the issue of managerial self-selection
into public vs private sectors under full information on the workers’ characteristics: they argue that the
return to managerial ability is always lower in the public than in the private sector, provided that the
demand for public sector output is not too high and that motivation is unrelated to either eﬀort provision
or to the ﬁrm’s outcome. They conclude that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public
sector by increasing remuneration up to the private sector levels is not eﬃcient. Finally, Barigozzi et al.
(2013) and Barigozzi and Turati (2012) consider labor supply in a market where workers have private
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information on both productive ability and motivation. They show that the lemons’ problem might
be exacerbated by the presence of multidimensional asymmetric information because an increase in the
market wage can determine a simultaneous decrease both in average vocation and in average productivity
of applicants.
Our paper is also closely related to Handy and Katz (1998) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008). The
ﬁrst authors argue that non-proﬁts attract motivated managers by oﬀering them compensation packages
involving lower money wages and a larger component of institution-speciﬁc fringe beneﬁts as compared to
the private sector. But their results are driven by an exogenously given ranking of reservation wages for
the diﬀerent types of managers. Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) characterize the optimal incentive schemes
oﬀered by a public agency when workers diﬀer in laziness (the opposite of our productive ability) and
public service motivation. They show that, when workers’ eﬀort is contractible and when the production
required by the public institution is suﬃciently high, the institution attracts dedicated and productive
workers as well as the laziest workers.3 We depart from the last paper in two main ways: we consider
one sector in isolation and our principal is not constrained to hire at most two types of agents.
The literature on the analysis of optimal screening of agents with unknown characteristics has ﬂour-
ished in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, this problem has mainly been
examined under the assumption of unidimensional asymmetric information. The interesting and pos-
sibly more realistic cases where agents have several unobservable characteristics have been studied by
few important exceptions: Armstrong and Rochet (1999), Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chonè (1998),
Armstrong (1999), Basov (2001, 2005) and Deneckere and Severinov (2011). They all show that it is al-
most impossible to extend to the multidimensional environment the qualitative results and the regularity
conditions of the unidimensional case.
Armstrong and Rochet (1999) provide a complete characterization of the optimal contracts when
the dimensionality of actions is the same as the dimensionality of private information, the type space is
discrete and there are common values (namely the parameters of private information enter directly the
objective function of the principal). Our model too is characterized by a discrete type space, but there is
one screening instrument only available to the principal (namely the contractible eﬀort level) and there
are private values, hence the results in Armstrong and Rochet (1999) cannot be applied to our setting.
When the dimensionality of actions is smaller than the dimensionality of private information and the
type space is continuous, Laﬀont et al. (1987) explicitly solve the problem of optimal nonlinear pricing
by a regulated monopoly. Again in the continuous setup, Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chonè (1998),
Basov (2001, 2005) and Deneckere and Severinov (2011) present several useful techniques to solve the
problem of multidimensional screening, which cannot be applied when the types space is discrete. These
3Dedicated workers exert higher eﬀort than in the private, perfectly competitive sector whereas lazy workers’ eﬀort is
distorted downwards.
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papers show that exclusion is generic and full separation of types is impossible. In other words, it is
typically optimal for the principal not to serve the lower part of the agent’s distribution and to oﬀer the
same contract to diﬀerent (usually intermediate) types of agents.
Our analysis owes much to Armstrong (1999), who considers optimal price regulation of a monopoly
that is privately informed about both its cost and demand function. Like ours, his model is discrete
and features one instrument and two dimensions of private information, but his analysis has common
values while ours has private values. Armstrong (1999) distinguishes two main classes of problems. If
cost uncertainty is relatively more important than demand uncertainty, then optimal prices are always
weakly above marginal costs. Conversely, if demand uncertainty is more signiﬁcant than cost uncertainty,
then pricing below marginal cost could be optimal. In both classes of solutions some pooling of types
always exists, a result which is driven by the fact that “participation constraints do not tie-in nicely
with the natural ordering of types”.4 Moreover, the author explicitly ignores the issue of exclusion by
restricting the parameter space so that it is never optimal for the regulator to shut down some types of
ﬁrm. These facts represent a main diﬀerence with respect to our model where participation constraints
are well-behaved and where we ﬁnd that, from the principal’s viewpoint, full separation of types always
dominates pooling and full participation always dominates exclusion.
Finally, some papers analyze the issue of multidimensional screening in insurance markets. Crocker
and Snow (2011) consider a perfectly competitive market where consumers possess hidden knowledge
of their probability (high or low) of incurring a loss. They show that bundled coverage of diﬀerent
perils and diﬀerent losses allows insurers to screen applicants in several dimensions thereby reducing
the costs that low-risk applicants bear to distinguish themselves from high-risk ones. But their eﬃcient
bundling of coverage into a single insurance policy essentially reduces the problem to a one-dimensional
screening environment. Olivella and Schroyen (2013) describe a monopolistic insurance company facing
a population of individuals who diﬀer both in their risks and in their risk aversion. They solve a discrete
bidimensional screening problem that bears many similarities to ours and completely characterize the set
of optimal contracts.5 They ﬁnd that it is never optimal to fully separate all the types and that exclusion
of some high-risk individuals may be optimal.
It is also worth mentioning that in health economics, some research has been conducted on altruistic
physicians, whose preferences include both monetary rewards and their patients’ health status, which in
turn depend on physicians’ services. Chonè and Ma (2011) and Liu and Ma (2013) study continuous
settings where the physician is the agent characterized by bidimensional private information both on her
4See footnote 11 on page 207.
5They have a similar double-crossing condition for intermediate types and two possible orderings of co-insurance rates
that in turn generate two classes of solutions depending on how the diﬀerence in expected losses compares with the diﬀerence
in the degree of absolute risk aversion.
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level of altruism and on the health status of the patient. The insurer is the principal who uses a screening
mechanism based only on the physician’s degree of altruism. In both papers, the authors apply a limited
liability constraint for the physician, implying that his/her participation constraint does not include the
psychological beneﬁts due to altruism.
2 The model
We consider a principal-agent model with bidimensional adverse selection. Both the principal and the
agent are risk neutral. The principal (he) is willing to hire only one agent (she) to perform a given task.
The production function is such that the only input is labor supplied by the agent. We call e the
observable and measurable eﬀort (task) level that the agent is asked to provide.6 The production function
displays constant returns to eﬀort in such a way that q (e) = e. The principal’s payoﬀ function can be
written as
π = e−w,
where the price of output is assumed to be exogenous and normalized to 1, and w is the total salary paid
to the hired worker. Since the principal’s proﬁt only indirectly depends on the type of the agent, we are
considering a setting with private values.
Suppose that agents diﬀer in two characteristics, productive ability and intrinsic motivation, that are
independently distributed.7 We interpret workers characterized by high ability as agents incurring in a low
cost of providing a given eﬀort level. Workers can have only two possible levels of ability θi ∈ {θL, θH} .
Employees can have high ability, i.e. they can have a low cost of eﬀort θL, with probability ν, or they can
have low ability and a high cost of eﬀort θH , with probability 1− ν, where θH > θL > 0. As for intrinsic
motivation, we mainly refer to Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) and assume that workers, to a certain extent,
derive utility from exerting eﬀort. Since there exists a one-to-one relationship between eﬀort exerted and
output produced by the ﬁrm, this interpretation is equivalent to considering intrinsic motivation as the
enjoyment of one’s personal contribution to the ﬁrm’s outcome.8 ,9 Paralleling ability, we assume that
motivation can take only two possible values γj ∈ {γL, γH} . Workers can have either high motivation
6 In particular, the variable e can be interpreted as a job-speciﬁc requirement like the amount of hours of labor the agent
is asked to devote to production or the speed at which a production line is run in a factory.
7Allowing for more general distribution functions that admit correlation between ability and motivation does not alter
our results, since all possible classes of equilibria that we ﬁnd are still relevant with a more general distribution.
8The same interpretation of intrinsic motivation can be found in Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur
(2007, 2008, 2010-only as for Section 5) and traces back to the “warm-glow giving” or impure altruism theory in Andreoni
(1990).
9A slightly diﬀerent view of intrinsic motivation (which suits the model as well) is given by Delfgaauw and Dur (2007,
page 607), who argue that intrinsic motivation might arise because “the ﬁrm has some unique trait that is valued diﬀerently
by diﬀerent workers, giving the ﬁrm monopsony power”. They also add: “Monopsony power arises naturally when intrinsic
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γH , with probability µ, or low motivation γL , with probability 1− µ. So there are four types of agents
denoted as ij = {LH,LL,HH,HL} where the ﬁrst index represents the cost of eﬀort provision and the
second motivation.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the lower bounds of the support of the distribution for both
attributes, setting θL = 1 and γL = 0. We will thus focus on situations in which agents can be either
intrinsically motivated, with motivation parameter taking value γH = γ or not motivated at all. Our
results will largely depend on how the diﬀerence or heterogeneity in motivation ∆γ = γH−γL = γ relates
to the diﬀerence in ability ∆θ = θH − θL = θ− 1. Given our normalization, we will refer to the diﬀerence
in motivation ∆γ and to the level of motivation γ interchangeably. Furthermore, we will impose that
∆γ ≤ 1 or else that 0 < γ ≤ 1 and that ∆θ ≤ 1 or else that 1 < θH = θ ≤ 2 (the reader is referred to
Section 3.1 for the discussion of such assumptions).
The agents’ reservation utility is normalized to zero for all possible types.
Workers’ utility is quasi-linear in income and takes the form
uij = wij − 1
2
θie
2
ij + γjeij ,
where both productivity θi and motivation γj are related to eﬀort exertion, although productivity θi
enters utility with a convex term, while motivation γj enters utility with a linear term.
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The marginal rate of substitution between eﬀort and wage is given by
MRSe,w = − ∂uij/∂eij
∂uij/∂wij
= θieij − γj ,
which is always positive for non-motivated workers with γj = 0. When the eﬀort required by the
principal is suﬃciently high, i.e. when eij >
γj
θi
, also motivated workers’ indiﬀerence curves have the
standard positive slope in the space (e,w) and eﬀort is a “bad”.
Note that providing eﬀort represents a net cost to the agent when
−1
2
θie
2
ij + γjeij < 0.
Thus, if the eﬀort required by the principal is suﬃciently low, motivated workers could perform their task
also when receiving a non-positive reward, in other words they would be ready to volunteer to be hired
by the ﬁrm.
motivation is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. When it is related to an occupation rather than to working at a particular ﬁrm, monopsony
power arises only if there is no other ﬁrm (in the neighborhood) oﬀering similar jobs”. In turn, the link between workers’
motivation and market power justiﬁes our hypothesis concerning proﬁt maximization and wage setting on the part of the
principal.
10This linear-quadratic speciﬁcation of the utility function is widely used in the literature on workers’ intrinsic motivation
(see Besley and Ghatak 2005 and Delfgaauw and Dur 2010). The same objective function for the agent is also considered in
the literature on multidimensional screening with a continuum of types (see Laﬀont et al. 1987, Basov 2005, and Deneckere
and Severinov 2011), where solutions are found imposing that the type space be the unit square.
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Remark 1 When eiH <
2γ
θi
, a motivated worker obtains a net positive utility from eﬀort exertion and is
thus willing to receive a non-positive reward. We call such a worker a “volunteer”.
Finally, notice that agents’ utility function satisﬁes the single-crossing property with respect to each
parameter of private information at a time.11
Remark 2 The single-crossing property is satisﬁed with respect to the ability parameter and with respect
to motivation. In fact MRSe,w is increasing in θ (holding motivation constant) and decreasing in γ
(holding ability constant).
This means that the indiﬀerence curves of types with the same motivation but diﬀerent ability intersect
only once for e = 0 , and the same is true for the indiﬀerence curves of workers endowed with the same
ability but diﬀerent motivation. Nonetheless, the single-crossing property does not hold when both ability
and motivation change simultaneously.
Remark 3 The indiﬀerence curves of intermediate types HH and LL cross twice, the second intersection
occurring at e = 2γ
θ−1 .
Considering the combined impact of both ability and motivation on the worker’s eﬀort and on the
ﬁrm’s output, we can say that the most eﬃcient type is worker LH (with low eﬀort cost and high
motivation) who is expected to exert the highest eﬀort, whereas the least eﬃcient type is worker HL
(with high eﬀort cost and no motivation) who is expected to provide the lowest eﬀort. Worker types LL
and HH are in-between and their eﬀort levels cannot be ordered unambiguously.12
In Section 4, we will assume that the principal oﬀers the agent a menu of contracts of the form
{e,w (e)}. Applying the Revelation Principle, we will focus on four contracts such that a worker of type
ij exerts eﬀort eij and receives a wage w (eij) = wij . Before turning to the second-best, let us examine
the benchmark cases in which either there is no private information at all (the ﬁrst-best) or there is only
one characteristic that is the agent’s private information.
11All the properties of the utility function extend to the more general case in which the cost of eﬀort is still convex while
the beneﬁt from exerting eﬀort, due to intrinsic motivation, is concave. Moreover, it is possible to prove that all qualitative
results concerning the second-best solutions carry on in this general case.
12Notice that the existence of two possible orderings of eﬀort levels is a consequence of the bidimensionality of our problem
and of the failure of the single-crossing condition. It could not be generated in a unidimensional set-up with diﬀerent types
of employees characterized by a single summary statistic, like the overall cost of providing eﬀort.
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3 Benchmark cases
3.1 Full information
At the ﬁrst-best, both ability and motivation are observable. For i = L,H and j = L,H, the principal
solves the problem
max
(eij ,wij)
π = eij −wij (FB)
s.t. uij ≥ 0
which yields a level of eﬀort equal to
eFBij =
1 + γj
θi
(1)
and where the wage levels are set such that each worker receives her zero reservation utility
wFBij =

1 + γj
 
1− γj

2θi
.
If γj ≤ 1 is satisﬁed, then, at the ﬁrst-best, all wages are non-negative and motivated workers are not
volunteers since they face a net cost from exerting eﬀort.13
Assumption 1 Let 0 < γ ≤ 1. Then, motivated workers are not volunteers and always receive a non-
negative salary at the ﬁrst-best.
The intuition for this requirement is straightforward. Given Program FB and ﬁrst-order condition
(1), we can interpret 1 + γ as the total marginal productivity of eﬀort. When γ ≤ 1, the contribution of
worker’s intrinsic motivation on the marginal productivity of eﬀort does not dominate the standard one.
Importantly, at the second-best, Assumption 1 is no longer suﬃcient to ensure that the low-ability
motivated type HH bears a net cost of exerting eﬀort, because eﬀort levels might be distorted downwards
(the standard result of distortion for types diﬀerent from the “top” one holds). This implies that, in the
next Sections, it will be necessary to check whether eSBHH 
2γ
θ
and it will be shown that the worker type
HH can experience a net utility from eﬀort provision, so that she may become a (paid) volunteer at the
second-best.
It is immediate to check that eFBLH > e
FB
HH > e
FB
HL and e
FB
LH > e
FB
LL > e
FB
HL both hold. Also note that,
for intermediate types, one has
eFBLL < e
FB
HH if and only if γ > ∆θ ≡ γ∗, (2)
13This assumption allows us to exclude situations where, at the ﬁrst-best, motivated workers receive a negative wage while
non motivated employees receive a positive salary. Our analysis can easily be extended to allow for volunteers and standard
workers to coexist at the ﬁrst-best. At the second-best, threshold values obtained when the diﬀerence in motivation is more
important than the diﬀerence in ability would change, whereas the classes of equilibria when ability prevails over motivation
would not be aﬀected.
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or
eFBLL > e
FB
HH if and only if γ < ∆θ ≡ γ∗, (3)
while eFBLL = e
FB
HH whenever γ = γ
∗. Hence, γ = γ∗ can be deﬁned as the value of motivation such that
the type space corresponds to a square and types LL and HH become equivalent.14
Inequality (2) can be restated as15
eFBLL < e
FB
HH <
γ
∆θ
, (4)
and (3) is equivalent to
eFBLL > e
FB
HH >
γ
∆θ
. (5)
Given Assumption 1, a necessary condition for (2) is that γ∗ ≤ 1 or else that θ ≤ 2.
Remark 4 The ordering of eﬀort levels at the ﬁrst-best is as follows:
1. If θ ≤ 2 and γ > γ∗ both hold, then the ordering of eﬀort levels is eFBLH > eFBHH > eFBLL > eFBHL.
2. If γ < γ∗, then the ordering of eﬀort levels is eFBLH > e
FB
LL > e
FB
HH > e
FB
HL.
Intuitively, when γ > γ∗, the diﬀerence in motivation, or simply γ, is higher than the diﬀerence
in ability ∆θ, in which case the eﬀort provided by type HH is higher than that of type LL and the
ﬁrst ranking in the Remark is relevant. Conversely, when γ < γ∗ the diﬀerence in ability ∆θ is more
important than the diﬀerence in motivation: now the second ranking in the Remark is relevant and the
eﬀort provided by type LL must be higher than the eﬀort level of type HH.
The parameter γ∗ will play a crucial role not only under full information but also at the second-best.
In particular, we will show that the second-best optimal contracts require pooling between types LL and
HH in a whole region around γ = γ∗ and that the ranking of types at the ﬁrst- and second-best is the
same (see Figure 4 in Section 4).
Since both instances in Remark 4 are economically relevant, we impose that γ∗ ≤ 1 which is equivalent
to θ ≤ 2.
Assumption 2 Let 1 < θ ≤ 2. Then 0 < γ∗ ≤ 1 holds and all orderings eFBHH  eFBLL are possible.
Let us consider the ranking of wages with perfect information.
14Note that both γ and ∆θ may assume diﬀerent values in our model so that a continuum of possible “square” type
spaces exists.
15Take eFBLL > e
FB
HH . This amounts to 1 >
1+γ
θ
or else to θ > 1 + γ. It follows that γ < θ − 1 = ∆θ or else that
γ
∆θ
< 1 = eFBLL . Similarly, starting from γ < ∆θ and adding to both sides of the inequality γ∆θ yields
γ
∆θ
< 1+γ
θ
= eFBHH .
The same reasoning can be applied to the opposite case in which eFBHH > e
FB
LL .
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Remark 5 The ordering of wage levels at the ﬁrst-best is as follows:
wFBLL > max

wFBLH , w
FB
HL
 ≥ minwFBLH , wFBHL > wFBHH ≥ 0
For ﬁxed ability, motivated workers always obtain lower rewards than non-motivated ones. In addition,
when wFBHL > w
FB
LH ,motivated workers always earn less than non-motivated workers independently of their
ability.
3.2 Adverse selection on ability
Suppose that workers’ motivation γj is observable to the principal but ability θi is not, we call this case
Benchmark A, or BA. For ﬁxed j = L,H the principal solves
max
(eHj ,wHj);(eLj ,wLj)
E (π) = ν (eLj −wLj) + (1− ν) (eHj −wHj) (BA)
subject to the participation constraint of the low-ability type and to the incentive compatibility constraint
of the high-ability worker. Solving for the eﬀort levels, we ﬁnd
eBALj = 1 + γj = e
FB
Lj
and
eBAHj =

1 + γj

(1− ν)
(θ − ν) ,
where the results of no distortion at the top and downward distortion in the eﬀort exerted by the low-
ability worker both hold. It is easy to show that full participation is always optimal or that it is never in
the principal’s interest to exclude low-ability workers (types Hj).16
As for wages, we have wBAHH > 0 if and only if
γ <
θ (1− ν)
(θ − ν) + ν∆θ ≡ γ
BA < 1,
meaning that, when ability is workers’ private information while motivation is observable, type HH can
become a volunteer if motivation is high enough. Moreover, for any given level of employees’ motivation,
the wage rate is increasing in workers’ ability.
3.3 Adverse selection on motivation
Suppose now that workers’ ability θi is observable to the principal but motivation γj is not, we call this
case Benchmark M , or BM . For ﬁxed i = L,H the principal solves
max
(eiH ,wiH);(eiL,wiL)
E (π) = µ (eiH −wiH) + (1− µ) (eiL −wiL) (BM)
16 In fact, the principal’s beneﬁt from keeping worker Hj is the expected proﬁt from this worker (1− ν)

eHj −wHj

,
whereas the cost from letting her participate is the information rent 1
2
∆θe2Hj multiplied by the proportion of workers
receiving the rent, that is ν. By substituting the expression for the wage in (1− ν)

eHj − wHj

, it can be checked that
the principal always oﬀers a non-null contract to low-ability workers, independently of their motivation.
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subject to the participation constraint of the non-motivated type and to the incentive compatibility
constraint of the motivated worker. In fact, motivated agents have interest in mimicking non-motivated
ones whenever the eﬀort they are required to provide is suﬃciently high so as to cause a disutility.
Solving for eﬀort levels we ﬁnd
eBMiH =
1 + γ
θi
= eFBiH
and
eBMiL =
(1− µ)− µγ
(1− µ) θi
where the results of no distortion at the top and downward distortion in the eﬀort exerted by the non-
motivated worker both hold. Also, eBMiL > 0 for
γ <
1− µ
µ
≡ γBM
where γ < γBM always holds if µ < 12 . In words, when γ is suﬃciently high, the information rent that
the principal must pay to the motivated types is so costly that he prefers to exclude non-motivated
workers. However, the necessary condition for full participation, that is eBMiL > 0, is always satisﬁed if
the proportion µ of motivated workers is suﬃciently low. Following the same procedure as in Footnote
16, it can be checked that eBMiL > 0 is both necessary and suﬃcient for full participation.
As for wages, they are always increasing in motivation and wiH > wiL. Hence, when motivation
is workers’ private information and ability is observable, the ranking of salaries for workers who are
equally skilled but have diﬀerent vocation is reversed with respect to the ﬁrst-best. This is because of
the information rents that motivated workers receive.
4 Screening on both ability and motivation
The benchmark cases with unidimensional hidden information provide the following predictions: (i)
When the principal cannot observe workers’ skills (but is perfectly informed about their motivation), he
might take advantage of motivated workers and make them work for free; as we will see, this turns out
to be impossible at the second-best. (ii) When the principal cannot observe workers’ motivation (but is
perfectly informed about their skills), he might ﬁnd in his interest to exclude non-motivated employees,
no matter whether they have high- or low-ability; the exclusion of skilled, non-motivated workers will
always be dominated at the second-best. Furthermore, given ability, motivated employees are always
oﬀered a higher salary than non-motivated ones; this result stands in contrast with the ﬁrst-best but will
be conﬁrmed at the second-best.
Suppose now that both the workers’ ability θi and motivation γj are the agents’ private informa-
tion, we call this situation the second-best. The principal oﬀers the worker a choice of four eﬀort-wage
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combinations. For i = L,H and j = L,H, the principal’s program is
max(eij ,wij)E (π) = νµ (eLH −wLH) + ν (1− µ) (eLL −wLL)+
(1− ν)µ (eHH −wHH) + (1− ν) (1− µ) (eHL −wHL)
(SB)
subject to four participation constraints whose generic form is
wij − 1
2
θie
2
ij + γjeij ≥ 0 (PCij)
and twelve incentive compatibility constraints that are such that
wij − 1
2
θie
2
ij + γjeij ≥ wi′j′ −
1
2
θie
2
i′j′ + γjei′j′ (ICijvsi′j′)
with ij diﬀerent from i′j′. All constraints are listed in Appendix B, where we show that incentive
compatibility and participation constraints satisfy some regularity conditions.
When all participation and incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed, the solution to the princi-
pal’s program SB is characterized by full separation and full participation of types. In such instances, we
ﬁnd that if the participation constraint of the worst type HL holds then all other PCs are also satisﬁed.
Moreover, the following monotonicity (or implementability) condition holds
eLH ≥ max {eLL; eHH} ≥ min {eLL; eHH} ≥ eHL. (6)
Concerning intermediate types HH and LL, one can add ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsLL and ﬁnd that either
eSBHH > e
SB
LL and e
SB
LL + e
SB
HH ≤
2γ
∆θ
, (7)
or
eSBLL > e
SB
HH and e
SB
LL + e
SB
HH ≥
2γ
∆θ
(8)
holds. Otherwise eSBHH = e
SB
LL and bunching between intermediate types necessarily occurs. Although
conditions (7) and (8) are less transparent than the corresponding ﬁrst-best conditions (4) and (5), we
can still observe that eHH > eLL holds at the second-best when the quantity
γ
∆θ is high: paralleling the
ﬁrst-best, we will say that condition (7) is satisﬁed when the diﬀerence in motivation prevails over the
diﬀerence in ability in determining eﬀort and output provision. On the contrary, if condition (8) and
eLL > eHH hold at the second-best, then it is because the quantity
γ
∆θ is low and we will say that the
diﬀerence in ability prevails over motivation in determining eﬀort and output provision. A diﬀerence with
respect to the ﬁrst-best is that the term γ∆θ , reﬂecting the relative importance of motivation heterogeneity
vis à vis ability heterogeneity, is doubled in (7) and (8), since it must now be compared with the sum of
the two eﬀort levels exerted by intermediate types.17 Observations 1 and 2, respectively, will show that
17Note that condition (4) is per se more restrictive than (7) and that condition (5) is again more restrictive than condition
(8). Hence, one can in principle expect some misalignment between ﬁrst- and second-best eﬀort levels as for intermediate
types, but this will not be the case as Proposition 2 points out.
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while monotonicity condition (7) implies that the incentive compatibility constraint ICHHvsLL is binding,
condition (8) does not rule out situations in which ICHHvsLL still binds or in which the allocations of
types HH and LL are envy-free.
When considering solutions characterized by full separation and full participation of types, we will
solve a relaxed program in which only PCHL and some (mostly downward) incentive constraints will
bind; we will check ex post that the omitted constraints are veriﬁed as well. Nonetheless, it might
well be that some constraints fail to hold and that the optimal contract calls for the exclusion of some
workers’ types or for pooling or both. It is possible to show that the solution to program SB entailing
full participation and full separation of types always yields the highest proﬁts to the principal, who will
then always implement it when possible.18
Proposition 1 Independently of whether motivation or ability prevail, i.e. independently of whether con-
dition (7) or condition (8) holds, the principal’s proﬁts are maximal at the solution with full participation
and full separation of types.
Proof. The proof for the situation in which motivation prevails is illustrated in Appendix C.3. It requires
all results derived from the full characterization of the diﬀerent classes of optimal contracts (full screening,
pooling and contracts with exclusion) and the conditions for their existence. The procedure for the case
in which ability prevails is equivalent and then omitted.
The above Proposition is anticipated here for expositional purposes. In what follows, we will present
the classes of solutions characterized by full participation and full separation of types, classifying them
according to whether condition (7) or condition (8) holds. We are going to explain which incentive
constraints are binding in the two alternative situations. The aim of such discussion is mainly descriptive,
since we would like to give the reader a complete overview of the results we obtained. The more detailed
analysis of the diﬀerent classes of optimal contracts is given in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 and in the Appendix.
At the end of this Section, we will brieﬂy discuss the remaining classes of solutions entailing bunching or
exclusion, but their formal analysis can be found in the Appendix.
Observation 1 Motivation prevails (Case M) When condition (7) holds, motivation has a higher
impact on eﬀort provision than ability, and a solution to program SB with full participation and full
separation of types such that eHH > eLL might be attained. The binding downward incentive constraints
speciﬁc to this case are those of high-ability types mimicking low-ability ones, that is ICLHvsHH and
ICLLvsHL. The additional downward incentive constraint is ICHHvsLL, connecting the previous ones.
If motivation has a higher impact on eﬀort and output provision than ability, then from the principal’s
viewpoint, types can be ordered as LH ≻ HH ≻ LL ≻ LH. Now we have to solve a bidimensional
18As mentioned in the Related Literature, the implementability of fully separating and fully participating solutions is
unusual in models of multidimensional screening with discrete types and impossible when the types space is continuous.
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screening problem which embeds and generalizes the two sub-problems with adverse selection on the
workers’ ability only (Benchmark BA in Subsection 3.2). The two sub-problems BA are now considered
simultaneously and linked by incentive constraint ICHHvsLL. Figure 1 describes this case. On the
horizontal axis, we represent eﬀort cost or ability, while on the vertical axis we have motivation. Types
are located at the corners of a rectangle whose width is the diﬀerence in ability ∆θ, and whose height
is the diﬀerence in motivation ∆γ, or simply γ.19 An arrow from one type to another represents that
the incentive constraint that the former type does not choose the contract designed for the latter type is
binding.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2a around here
Intuitively, when the diﬀerence in motivation is more relevant than the diﬀerence in ability, the rectangle
on which types are located has height greater than width. Since types LH andHH on one hand and types
LL and HL on the other hand are close to each other, then it is natural that the incentive constraints
that bind ﬁrst are ICLHvsHH and ICLLvsHL. The remaining binding constraint is the one that concerns
intermediate types, namely ICHHvsLL. Indeed, Case M occurs when motivation γ is high enough, then
type HH is asked to provide a relative high eﬀort in exchange for a relatively low salary and she might
ﬁnd the contract (eLL, wLL) potentially convenient.
Observation 2 Ability prevails (Case A) When condition (8) holds, ability has a higher impact on
eﬀort provision than motivation, and a solution to program SB with full participation and full separation
of types such that eLL > eHH might be attained. The binding downward incentive constraint speciﬁc
to this case is that of the high-ability motivated type mimicking the high-ability non-motivated agent,
that is ICLHvsLL. As for the other relevant binding constraints, three sub-cases must be considered: (1)
Case A.1. The binding incentive constraints are the two adjacent ones ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsHL; (2)
Case A.2. The binding incentive constraints are ICLLvsHL and ICHHvsHL; (3) Case A.3. The binding
incentive constraints are ICLLvsHL and the upward ICHHvsLL.
If the diﬀerence in ability has a higher impact on eﬀort and output provision than the diﬀerence in
motivation, then, from the principal’s viewpoint, types can be ordered as LH ≻ LL ≻ HH ≻ LH. Now
we have a plurality of situations arising because the principal faces a trade-oﬀ between the need to satisfy
condition eLL > eHH and the incentive to increase eHH as motivation grows.
Case A.1 is the most natural one and is symmetric to Case M : it requires to solve a bidimensional
screening problem that consists of the two sub-programs related to adverse selection on workers’ mo-
tivation only (as Benchmark BM in Subsection 3.3) together with incentive constraint ICLLvsHH (see
19For simplicity, Figures from 1 to 2c are all drawn letting the diﬀerence in motivation ∆γ vary while keeping the diﬀerence
in eﬀort cost ∆θ constant. Actually, it might well be that diﬀerent contracts with full separation and full participation exist
for diﬀerent values of both ∆γ and ∆θ.
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Figure 2a). Now the rectangle on which types are located has height smaller than width, whereby the
types that are closest to each other are LH and LL on one hand and HH and HL on the other hand.
Then the incentive constraints that bind ﬁrst are those of the closest pairs ICLHvsLL and ICHHvsHL.
The remaining binding constraint is the one that concerns intermediate types, namely ICLLvsHH . Here,
the motivation level γ is suﬃciently low and then type LL might be induced to mimic type HH because
the former can beneﬁt from a lower eﬀort eHH and still enjoy a salary wHH which cannot be too low
(given that motivation plays a minor role).
Between Case M and Case A.1, that is when motivation is still less important than the diﬀerence
in ability but is not too low, the two less intuitive situations occur: Case A.2 and Case A.3. Here a
tension realizes since, on the one hand, type LL is asked to provide a higher eﬀort than type HH; on
the other hand, when moving from Case A.1 to Case M (i.e. when letting motivation γ grow), type
HH worker faces a diminishing disutility of eﬀort so that it becomes more and more convenient for the
principal to ask her to provide a larger eﬀort and to pay her a lower salary. This tension leads anomalous
incentive constraints to bind. In particular, Cases A.2 and A.3 emerge when type LL prefers to mimic
HL rather than HH so that the local downward incentive constraint ICLLvsHH is not binding anymore
and the global ICLLvsHL is binding instead. Then, together with the standard no-distortion at the top,
the principal will have no interest in distorting the eﬀort required to worker HH, because no other type
is willing to mimic HH.
Case A.2 represents a bidimensional screening problem consisting of the two sub-programs related to
adverse selection on workers’ motivation (as in Benchmark BM) which are now connected by incentive
constraint ICLLvsHL (see Figure 2b). Interestingly, it is the unique case in which there is no envy between
types LL and HH so that neither ICLLvsHH nor ICHHvsLL are binding.
In Case A.3, motivation keeps increasing and the disutility from the eﬀort exerted by type HH is
even lower than in Case A.2. Thus, it turns out that type HH mimics LL rather than HL. Now, not only
is the local downward incentive constraint ICLLvsHH slack, so that no-distortion for type HH occurs,
but the upward incentive constraint ICHHvsLL is binding instead. This occurs since the motivated type
HH values a relatively high wage associated with a high eﬀort (that she would obtain by mimicking LL)
more than the combination of low wage and low eﬀort (that she would get by mimicking HL). Case A.3
is represented in Figure 2c.
Insert Figure 2b and Figure 2c around here
Figure 3 illustrates the classes of optimal contracts just presented. Which class of solution realizes
depends on the relative position of the term 2γ∆θ with respect to the sum of diﬀerent pairs of eﬀort levels.
The distinction between Case M and Case A depends on conditions (7) and (8). In addition, in order
to discriminate among the diﬀerent situations arising when ability prevails, we consider which incentive
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constraints are binding and which are slack, as described in Observation 2.
Insert Figure 3 around here
Finally, Figure 4 describes optimal contracts as a function of motivation, focusing not only on the
existence regions for the four fully separating and fully participating equilibria but also considering
equilibria with pooling and/or exclusion that arise in-between. All equilibria are mutually exclusive,
since, for any given realization of the parameters γ ∈ (0, 1] and θ ∈ (1, 2], a diﬀerent solution to program
SB is obtained. In other words, the diﬀerent contacts appearing in Figure 4 are the ones that assure
the highest proﬁts to the principal among all possible solutions that might coexist in a given parameter
region. The dominating contracts for Case M are listed in Appendix C.4, while the dominating contracts
for Case A can be derived in the same way from the results contained in Appendix D.20
Insert Figure 4 around here
As for exclusion, Figure 4 shows that the occurrence of equilibria with exclusion is really limited and
essentially relegated to small regions lying in-between fully participating and fully separating solutions
for Case A.1 and Case A.2 and in-between fully participating and fully separating solutions for Case A.2
and Case A.3.
Concerning pooling contracts, note that, when motivation takes the lowest possible values (that is
below Case A.1 with full separation and full participation), then a pooling equilibrium where the low-
ability types HH and HL are given the same contract emerges (see Appendix D.1.2). At the other
extreme, for the highest possible values of motivation (that is above Case M with full separation and
full participation), a pooling equilibrium where the non-motivated types HL and LL are given the same
contract is attained (see Appendix C.2).
More importantly, there is a wide range of situations in which a solution with bunching of intermediate
types HH and LL is attained, especially when motivation and ability have a similar impact on eﬀort
provision, that is for values of γ close to γ∗. In a pooling equilibrium with eLL = eHH = ep , we must
distinguish two sub-cases: the ﬁrst one where the binding incentive constraint is ICHHvsHL, which is
relevant when ep + eHL ≥ 2γ∆θ (see Appendix D.4.1) and the second one where the binding incentive
constraint is ICLLvsHL, occurring when ep+ eHL ≤ 2γ∆θ (see Appendix D.4.2). When separation of types
LL and HH becomes impossible, Case A.1 turns to the pooling equilibrium with ICHHvsHL binding,
whereas Case M , Case A.2 and Case A.3 all turn to the pooling equilibrium with ICLLvsHL binding.
Interestingly, Figure 4 clearly shows that all optimal contracts involving separation of intermediate
types HH and LL (including not only full participation and full separation but possibly exclusion or
20Moreover, note that for some parameter conﬁgurations, some optimal contracts might not exist. Appendix E considers
the possible equilibria arising in the particular case in which the probability distribution of types is uniform.
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bunching of other types) under CaseM hold when γ > γ∗ while all optimal contracts involving separation
of intermediate types HH and LL (again, including not only full participation and full separation but
possibly exclusion or bunching of other types) under Case A attain when γ < γ∗. Therefore, when eﬀort
levels are aligned in a given way at the ﬁrst-best, then the same ordering of eﬀort levels arises at the
second-best.
Proposition 2 The ranking of second-best eﬀort levels is always the same as the ﬁrst-best ranking.
Proof. Looking at Figure 4, in order to prove the above Proposition it is suﬃcient to show that: (i) the
interval of motivation levels for which there exists a solution with full participation and full separation
under Case M lies to the right of γ∗ (this is done in Appendix C.1); (ii) the interval of motivation levels
for which there exists a solution with full participation and full separation under Case A.3 lies to the left
of γ∗ (and this is done in Appendix D.3.1).
5 Optimal contracts with full separation and full participation
In light of Proposition 1, in this Section we will focus on the characterization of contracts with full
participation and full separation of types, relegating to the Appendix the analysis of all situations with
pooling and/or exclusion of types. Instead of presenting all four possible classes of solutions, we will
restrict attention to the ones that arise when motivation is suﬃciently high, namely Cases M and A.3.21
The rationale behind such a choice is manyfold: (i) since our main contribution is in studying the impact
of intrinsic motivation on optimal screening contracts that a principal might oﬀer, it is reasonable to focus
on situations where motivation is signiﬁcant; (ii) Cases M and A.3 are almost exhaustive because they
belong to the two diﬀerent states of the world where motivation prevails or ability prevails, respectively:
(iii) Cases M and A.3 are close to each other in terms of existence conditions (see Figures 3 and 4)
and therefore they are more easily comparable than distant cases; (iv) ﬁnally and more interestingly,
contrasting the two situations, one can show that very high motivation might not be a desirable worker’s
characteristic for the principal.
To improve readability, in the text we mainly provide a qualitative description of the two diﬀerent
solutions with economic intuitions; we refer the reader to Appendices C.1 and D.3.1 for quantitative
results, technical statements concerning existence conditions and proofs concerning Cases M and A.3,
respectively.
21The analysis of Cases A.1 and A.2 will be carried out in Appendices D.1.1 and D.2.1, respectively.
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5.1 The solution when motivation prevails (Case M)
In Case M , a separating equilibrium occurs if condition (7) holds, that is if eHH > eLL and eLL+eHH ≤
2γ
∆θ both hold. The implementability condition (6) thus becomes eLH > eHH > eLL > eHL. The
constraints that are expected to bind at the optimum with full participation are the downward local
incentive constraints ICLHvsHH , ICHHvsLL, ICLLvsHL and PCHL (see Observation 1 and Figure 1). In
this situation, motivation γ is high enough for type HH to be asked to provide a relative high eﬀort in
exchange for a salary that is quite low (in fact wHH may also be lower than the salary oﬀered to worker
LL, as the inequality in Remark 6 which follows points out). Thus, type HH might ﬁnd the contract
(eLL, wLL) appealing.
Note that Case M (together with Case A.1) corresponds to the situation where our bidimensional
screening problem is equivalent to a unidimensional screening one with four types, the unidimensional
parameter of private information being the workers’ overall cost of eﬀort exertion.22
Given the binding constraints, we can solve for the wage schedules, which allow us to isolate the
information rents received by each type of worker
wHL =
1
2
θe2HL, (9)
wLL =
1
2
e2LL +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker LL
, (10)
wHH =
1
2
θe2HH − γeHH−
1
2
∆θe2LL + γeLL +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker HH
(11)
and ﬁnally
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+
1
2
∆θe2HH −
1
2
∆θe2LL + γeLL +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker LH
(12)
All types except HL receive an information rent and information rents cumulate when moving from
the worst type HL up to the best type LH. Since information rents are always increasing in the eﬀort
exerted by the types that can be mimicked, we obtain the familiar results of no distortion at the top
and downward distortions in eﬀort levels for all agents’ types other than LH. Moreover, all information
rents include at least one expression of the form 12∆θe
2
ij , as in Benchmark BA. Only motivated types
HH and LH receive an information rent depending also on motivation γ, which comes from the incentive
constraint ICHHvsLL linking the two unidimensional screening problems of Benchmark BA. In particular,
22Notice that, when motivation prevails over ability, we obtain a screening problem which is equivalent to the one of
benchmark BA, where the unidimensional private information is workers’ ability. The fact that here the relevant incentive
constraints are the ones of benchmark BA might seem counterintuite. Nonetheless, when motivation prevails, the constraints
that bind ﬁrst are precisely the ones connecting types characterized by the same motivation but diﬀerent ability (see Figure
1a).
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the rent received by type HH when mimicking LL is given by −12∆θe2LL + γeLL which is always positive
and increasing in eLL when motivation prevails.
Substituting the wage schedules into the principal’s objective function and maximizing yields the
optimal eﬀort levels eSBMij , whose expressions are provided in Appendix C.1. Interestingly, e
SBM
HH has the
same expression as in Benchmark BA. Nonetheless, eﬀort levels required from workers LL and HL are
more distorted than those in program BA, because of the cumulative eﬀect of information rents stemming
from the bidimensional nature of adverse selection.
Given the optimal eﬀorts, the optimal wage levels and the informational rents (i.e. indirect utilities)
can be ranked as follows.
Remark 6 When motivation prevails (Case M), at the optimal contract with full separation and full
participation, the ranking of wages is
wSBMLH > max

wSBMHH , w
SBM
LL
 ≥ minwSBMHH , wSBMLL  > wSBMHL > 0
and the ordering of information rents (indirect utilities) is
uSBMLH > u
SBM
HH > u
SBM
LL > u
SBM
HL = 0.
Information rents have the same ordering as eﬀort levels, while there can be a reversal in the ranking
of salaries for intermediate types. In other words, the principal could oﬀer the motivated but high-cost
type HH a contract in which eﬀort provision is higher and remuneration is lower than in the contract
proposed to type LL. Nonetheless, typeHH always enjoys a higher utility than type LL, because her high
motivation generates higher informational rents. This result is not trivial and depends on the peculiarity
of motivated workers’ utility function, which admits voluntary work.23 Moreover, when wSBMHH < w
SBM
LL
holds, then it is always the case that eSBMHH <
2γ
θ
, implying that motivated high-cost types HH enjoy a
net positive utility from eﬀort provision. This has a negative impact on total salary wHH (see the ﬁrst
two terms in expression 11), which is more than compensated by the positive eﬀect of information rents.
Corollary 1 When motivation prevails (Case M), at the optimal contract with full separation and full
participation, worker HH might be a “paid volunteer”: she is oﬀered a positive wage, but she enjoys a
positive utility from eﬀort exertion.
Actually, it is also possible (although very rare) that eSBMHH <
γ
θ
, in which case eﬀort required to type
HH is in the range in which her utility increases in eﬀort and her indiﬀerence curve is downward sloping in
23 In particular, wSBMHH < w
SBM
LL holds when the probability of high motivation µ is low relative to the probability of low
eﬀort cost ν, when the diﬀerence in ability ∆θ is high and when the level of motivation is high too.
22
the space (e,w). Then type HH would be willing to exert more eﬀort than her optimal contract speciﬁes
and it would be necessary for the principal to forbid this type to engage in voluntary overtime.24 , 25
Finally, the interval of motivation levels for which full participation and full separation is attained in
Case M always lies to the right of γ∗. Hence Case M realizes at the second-best when condition (2) holds
at the ﬁrst-best: this conﬁrms the result anticipated in Proposition 2, namely that eﬀort levels have the
same ranking both at ﬁrst- and at the second-best.
5.2 The solution when ability prevails (Case A)
When ability prevails, full separation occurs under condition (8), that is if eLL > eHH and eLL+eHH ≥ 2γ∆θ
both hold. The implementability condition (6) thus becomes eLH > eLL > eHH > eHL.
Three diﬀerent solutions characterized by full separation and full participation of types might be found
according to which incentive compatibility constraints are binding together with constraints ICLHvsLL
and PCHL (see Figure 3). In what follows, we concentrate on Case A.3.
5.2.1 Case A.3
Suppose that the binding incentive constraints are ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHL and the upward incentive con-
straint ICHHvsLL, together with participation constraint PCHL (see Figure 2c). This results in inequality
eHL + eLL ≤ 2γ∆θ ≤ eHH + eLL. This program bridges Cases A and Case M . Indeed, the incentive con-
straint that is shared with the other cases in which ability prevails is ICLHvsLL, whereas the other two
binding constraints are ICHHvsLL and ICLLvsHL as in Case M .
The relevant wage levels and informational rents are now
wHL =
1
2
θe2HL, (13)
wHH =
1
2
θe2HH − γeHH−
1
2
∆θe2LL + γeLL +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker HH
, (14)
wLL =
1
2
e2LL +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker LL
(15)
and
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+γeLL +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker LH
. (16)
24The same conclusion also holds when the optimal contract requires pooling between types HH and LL (see Appendix
D.4.2). Conversely, no such instance occurs when ability prevails.
25Nonetheless, being eﬀort perfectly observable and contractible, forbidding voluntary overtime does not invalidate our
results.
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The information rent of type HH is composed of two terms: one is 12∆θe
2
HL and represents the
rent received through type LL mimicking HL (which accrues to all types except HL); the other one is
−12∆θe2LL + γeLL and represents the part of the rent speciﬁc to type HH mimicking LL. The latter has
the same expression as in Case M and is strictly positive if and only if eLL <
2γ
∆θ , a condition which
is always satisﬁed when eHL + eLL ≤ 2γ∆θ , as in this case. Also note that motivated types receive an
information rent which depends both on the diﬀerence in ability and on motivation, so that this case
shares some features both with Benchmark BA and with Benchmark BM .
Substituting the wage functions into the principal’s expected proﬁts and maximizing, we obtain the
optimal eﬀort levels eSBA3ij , whose expressions are provided in Appendix D.3.1. We observe that e
SBA3
HL
has the same expression as eSBMHL and, more importantly, that both e
SBA3
LH and e
SBA3
HH are equal to their
ﬁrst-best levels.
Remark 7 When ability prevails and constraints ICLLvsHL and ICHHvsLL are binding (Case A.3), at
the optimal contract with full separation and full participation, the eﬀort of motivated types is never
distorted.
Since type LL is not willing to mimic type HH, the principal has no reasons to distort downwards
her eﬀort level. The same result holds in Case A.2 (see Appendix D.2.1).
Moreover, the usual downward distortion holds for type LL, despite the upward incentive constraint
ICHHvsLL being binding. Nonetheless note that, when the optimal contract calls for exclusion of type
HL (that is when motivation falls below the range in which full participation and full separation is
guaranteed), then it might well be that eﬀort eSBA3LL is distorted upward with respect to its ﬁrst-best
level. The existence of an upward distortion in second-best eﬀort levels parallels the result of sub-
marginal cost pricing in Armstrong (1999). Nonetheless, this result is only found when private and social
incentives diverge, that is when ﬁrst- and second-best allocations are not aligned.
Again, we ﬁnd that the interval of motivation levels for which full participation and full separation
is attained in Case A.3 always lies to the left of γ∗. Hence Case A.3 realizes at the second-best when
condition (3) holds at the ﬁrst-best: this conﬁrms the result anticipated in Proposition 2, namely that
eﬀort levels have the same ranking both at ﬁrst- and at the second-best.
Given the optimal eﬀorts, the optimal wage levels and the informational rents (i.e. indirect utilities)
can be ranked as follows.
Remark 8 When ability prevails and constraints ICLLvsHL and ICHHvsLL are binding (Case A.3), at
the optimal contract with full separation and full participation, the ordering of wages is
wSBA3LH > w
SBA3
LL > w
SBA3
HH > w
SBA3
HL > 0
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while the ranking of information rents is
uSBA3LH > u
SBA3
HH > u
SBA3
LL > u
SBA3
HL = 0.
While total salaries are monotonic in eﬀort levels, informational rents are not, since there is a switch
between intermediate types. In particular, the eﬀort that the motivated unskilled worker is asked to
provide is lower than the eﬀort required to the non-motivated skilled worker, even though the former
gains higher information rents than the latter. Such a switch of the information rents for intermediate
types depends both on the fact that type LL is not willing to mimic type HH (so that LL does not
receive any rent depending of the eﬀort exerted by HH) and on the fact that γ is suﬃciently high to
substantially reduce the disutility of eﬀort provision for type HH.
In the last part of this subsection, we provide a ﬁnal and important conclusion. In general, it is
extremely diﬃcult to make a comparison across the four classes of solutions with full participation and
full separation because they exist for diﬀerent and mutually exclusive parameter ranges. In particular,
it is not possible to provide a clear-cut ranking of Case A.3 and Case M, neither in terms of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts nor in terms of social surplus. Nonetheless, considering the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent
extraction faced by the principal, we can state the following result.
Remark 9 Given the diﬀerence in ability ∆θ, at the optimal contracts with full separation and full
participation of types, the principal pays lower informational rents in Case A.3 than in Case M .
Proof. See Appendix D.3.3.
The facts highlighted in Remarks 9, 7 and 1 suggest that the principal might be worse-oﬀ in Case M
than in Case A.3. Putting it diﬀerently, the high level of motivation supporting Case M might not be a
desirable workers’ characteristic from the principal’s point of view.
This result is reminiscent of Van den Steen (2006), who analyses the consequences of pay-for-performance
incentives when principal and agent might disagree on the optimal course of action and concludes that
motivation might be too high because it triggers agent’s disobedience.
6 Conclusion
It is argued that the eﬃcient selection of workers is more eﬀective, from the principal’s point of view,
than optimally designing incentives once the worker has been hired. In diﬀerent words, ﬁrms might
partially solve their agency problems by hiring agents with speciﬁc preferences (see Brehm and Gates
1997, Prendergast 2007, 2008). This seems particularly relevant in a labor market where potential workers
can be intrinsically motivated for the job, as in the public sector where employees might be endowed with
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public service motivation, or in the market for health professionals and for teachers where employees
frequently care for their patients and for their students respectively.
The existing literature on intrinsic motivation in the labor market has focused on two major issues:
(i) the lemons’ problem, mainly investigating adverse (vs propitious) selection eﬀects of workers’ private
information on the composition of the pool of active workers; (ii) the sorting of diﬀerent workers’ types
into diﬀerent sectors (vocational and non-vocational) of the labor market. We depart from the ﬁrst
strand of literature because we focus our attention at the individual level and examine a principal-agent
relationship. We also depart from the second strand of literature because we consider a single sector
in isolation. This allows us to fully solve the bidimensional screening problem and to contribute to the
existing literature, where the problem of workers’ self-selection has either been avoided (because full
information on the workers’ attributes has been considered, as in Delfgaauw and Dur 2010), or has been
modeled in a reduced form (with only a subset of workers being employed, as in Delfgaauw and Dur
2008).
In the paper, we fully characterize the diﬀerent classes of screening contracts, oﬀered by the ﬁrm to the
workers, which depend on whether ability or motivation is the main determinant of the workers’ overall
productivity. Unexpectedly, situations where motivation prevails over ability might not be desirable from
the ﬁrm’s point of view. The intuition for this result is the following: (i) when motivation is much more
important (or much less important) than ability, then we obtain standard screening contracts where
informational rents and eﬀort distortions cumulate in the usual way; (ii) when instead motivation is less
important than ability, but is however suﬃciently high, then it interacts with ability on incentives in such
a way that non standard contracts emerge with no eﬀort distortions for motivated workers and lower
information rents for all worker types.
A possible interpretation of our results is in terms of motivation-based versus skilled-based jobs. Let
us consider again the market for nurses. In the case of nurse aides, motivation is the main determinant
of workers’ performance, while in the case of registered nurses, performance in mainly driven by workers’
skills. Similarly in education, standard teachers are asked to perform tasks that are relatively more
skilled-based, whereas support teachers are involved in a more motivation-based job. Our results predict
that, from the employer’s point of view, screening workers comes at a lower cost in the case of a skilled-
based profession where, however, motivation is suﬃciently important in driving workers’ performance. In
particular, provided that the impact of motivation on performance is still suﬃciently high, screening for
highly performing registered nurses and high quality teachers is relatively cheaper than selecting good
nurse aides or good support teachers, respectively. Indeed, motivated registered nurses and teachers will
be required to exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, despite their private information on both ability and
motivation. We can conclude that motivation is a desirable workers’ characteristic only in the case of
skilled-based jobs.
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In our future research, we are willing to tackle the problem of sorting of diﬀerent workers’ types into
diﬀerent sectors of the labor market (being one of them vocation-based). In particular, we are going to
consider two principals competing for workers who are characterized by diﬀerent motivation and skill
levels. One principal represents the vocational sector and is thus interested in screening potential workers
with respect to both motivation and ability (as in the present analysis), while the other principal is only
interested in workers’ skills.
A Appendix
B Constraints
For type LH the constraints are
wLH − 1
2
e2LH + γeLH ≥ 0 (PCLH)
and
wLH − 1
2
e2LH + γeLH ≥ wLL −
1
2
e2LL + γeLL (ICLHvsLL)
wLH − 1
2
e2LH + γeLH ≥ wHH −
1
2
e2HH + γeHH (ICLHvsHH)
wLH − 1
2
e2LH + γeLH ≥ wHL −
1
2
e2HL + γeHL. (ICLHvsHL)
For type LL
wLL − 1
2
e2LL ≥ 0 (PCLL)
and
wLL − 1
2
e2LL ≥ wLH −
1
2
e2LH (ICLLvsLH)
wLL − 1
2
e2LL ≥ wHH −
1
2
e2HH (ICLLvsHH)
wLL − 1
2
e2LL ≥ wHL −
1
2
e2HL. (ICLLvsHL)
For type HH
wHH − 1
2
θe2HH + γeHH ≥ 0 (PCHH)
and
wHH − 1
2
θe2HH + γeHH ≥ wLH −
1
2
θe2LH + γeLH (ICHHvsLH)
wHH − 1
2
θe2HH + γeHH ≥ wLL −
1
2
θe2LL + γeLL (ICHHvsLL)
wHH − 1
2
θe2HH + γeHH ≥ wHL −
1
2
θe2HL + γeHL. (ICHHvsHL)
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Finally, for type HL one has
wHL − 1
2
θe2HL ≥ 0 (PCHL)
and
wHL − 1
2
θe2HL ≥ wLH −
1
2
θe2LH (ICHLvsLH)
wHL − 1
2
θe2HL ≥ wLL −
1
2
θe2LL (ICHLvsLL)
wHL − 1
2
θe2HL ≥ wHH −
1
2
θe2HH . (ICHLvsHH)
Considering participation constraints, one can show that participation constraint PCHH is auto-
matically satisﬁed when PCHL and ICHHvsHL both hold. Also, participation constraint PCLH is au-
tomatically satisﬁed when PCLL and ICLHvsLL are. Finally, once incentive constraint ICLLvsHL and
participation constraint PCHL hold, then also participation constraint PCLL is satisﬁed. So, when all
worker types are expected to be hired by the principal and when there is truthful revelation (that is
under full participation and full separation of types), it is only necessary to consider the participation
constraint of the worst type HL.
As for the incentive compatibility constraints, one can sum them two by two yielding a partial ranking
of eﬀort levels. In particular, adding ICLLvsHL to ICHLvsLL and summing ICHHvsLH to ICLHvsHH one
has eLj ≥ eHj ∀j = L,H, meaning that, given motivation, eﬀort required must be higher the lower the
eﬀort cost. In the same way, adding ICHHvsHL to ICHLvsHH on the one hand and adding ICLHvsLL to
ICLLvsLH on the other hand yields eiH ≥ eiL ∀i = L,H. Namely, for a given eﬀort cost, eﬀort is higher
the higher the motivation. Hence the monotonicity condition (6) in the main text holds. Condition
(6) also allows us to eliminate some “global” downward incentive constraints and focus on “local” ones.
Indeed, adding ICLHvsHH and ICHHvsHL one obtains
wLH − 1
2
e2LH + γeLH ≥ wHL −
1
2
θe2HL + γeHL +
1
2
∆θe2HH .
But, when eHH ≥ eHL, the right-hand side of the above inequality is greater than wHL − 12e2HL + γeHL,
which in turn implies that the global downward incentive constraint ICLHvsHL is satisﬁed when the two
local incentives constraints ICLHvsHH and ICHHvsHL are.26
What about intermediate types HH and LL? Adding ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsLL one has
1
2
∆θ (eLL − eHH) (eLL + eHH)− γ (eLL − eHH) ≥ 0,
which is satisﬁed for all eHH = eLL or for eHH = eLL when either condition (7) or condition (8) in the
main text hold.
26The same conclusion holds taking the two local incentives ICLHvsLL and ICLLvsHL.
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Using the same arguments as before, one can get rid of other global constraints. Suppose that condition
(7) is veriﬁed: then, the sum of the local constraints ICLHvsHH and ICHHvsLL implies that the global
constraint ICLHvsLL is satisﬁed as well. Moreover, ICHHvsLL and ICLLvsHL imply ICHHvsHL. By
the same token, suppose that condition (8) holds: then, one can prove that constraints ICLHvsLL and
ICLLvsHH imply constraint ICLHvsHH and also that ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsHL can be used to eliminate
ICLLvsHL.
C Motivation prevails (Case M)
C.1 Full separation and full participation
Let us look for a contract such that every type of worker is oﬀered a diﬀerent contract and such that all
types are hired. When all downward local incentive constraints ICLHvsHH , ICHHvsLL, ICLLvsHL and
participation constraint PCHL hold with equality, optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eSBMLH = 1 + γ, (17)
eSBMHH =
(1− ν) (1 + γ)
(θ − ν) , (18)
eSBMLL =
ν (1− µ)− µγ
(1− (1− ν) (1− µ))− µθ (19)
and
eSBMHL =
(1− ν) (1− µ)
θ − (1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) , (20)
where the superscripts stand for second-best, Case M.
Note that all eﬀort levels are always strictly positive, except for eSBMLL . In order for e
SBM
LL to be
positive and to be a maximum of the principal’s expected proﬁts, it is necessary to impose that both the
numerator and the denominator in expression (19) be positive;27 it must be that both
γ <
ν (1− µ)
µ
= γ0, (21)
where γ0 > 1 for µ >
ν
1+ν = µ0 (thus µ > µ0 implies that γ < γ0 is always veriﬁed), and
θ <
(1− (1− ν) (1− µ))
µ
= θ
M
1 ,
with θ
M
1 > 1, hold.
As far as the monotonicity conditions are concerned, eSBMHH > e
SBM
LL is satisﬁed if and only if
γ >
(µ (1− ν) + ν (1− µ))∆θ
νµ∆θ + (1− ν) (1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) = γ
SBM ,
27This can easily be seen by collecting eLL in the principal’s objective function, once the wage schedules have been
substituted, and observing the sign of the coeﬃcient of e2LL.
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where γSBM < 1 is always the case for (3µν − ν − µ) ≥ 0, that is for ν > 13 and µ ≥ ν(3ν−1) , whereas, for
(3µν − ν − µ) < 0, inequality γSBM < 1 is true when
θ <
µ+ ν − 3µν + (1− ν) (1− (1− ν) (1− µ))
µ+ ν − 3µν = θ
M
2
with θ
M
2 > θ
M
1 if and only if µ > µ0 (with µ0 <
1
2). Moreover, e
SBM
HL < e
SBM
LL holds for
γ <
(1− µ) (1− (1− ν) (1− µ))∆θ
µ (∆θ + (1− µ) (1− ν)) = γ
SBM ,
with γSBM < 1 being always the case for µ ≥ µ0.
Recall that condition (7), which amounts to eSBMLL + e
SBM
HH ≤ 2γ∆θ , must be satisﬁed and this is
equivalent to
γ ≥ ∆θ (2ν (1− µ) (1− ν) + (ν − µ)∆θ)
2ν (1− ν) (1− µ) +∆θν (2− µ (θ + 1))−∆θ (1− ν) (1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) = γ
SBM
1 ,
where γSBM1 < γ
SBM if and only if θ < θ
M
1 . Finally, note that the chain of inequalities γ
SBM
1 < γ
∗ <
γSBM < γSBM < γ0 holds provided that the denominator of e
SBM
LL is positive, that is provided that
θ < θ
M
1 .
Result 1 summarizes what we have found so far.
Result 1 Full participation and full separation when motivation prevails. A solution to the
principal’s program SB which entails full participation and full separation of types, which satisﬁes the
monotonicity condition eLH > eHH > eLL > eHL > 0, and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by
expressions from (17) to (20) exists if and only if θ < min
	
θ
M
1 , θ
M
2


and γSBM < γ < γSBM with
γSBM ≡ (µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ))∆θ(νµ∆θ+(1−ν)(1−(1−ν)(1−µ)))
γSBM ≡ (1−µ)(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))∆θ
µ(θ−(1−(1−ν)(1−µ)))
θ
M
1 ≡ (1−(1−ν)(1−µ))µ
θ
M
2 ≡ ((µ+ν−3µν)+(1−ν)(1−(1−ν)(1−µ)))(µ+ν−3µν)
.
Interestingly, both γ∗ < γSBM and min
	
θ
M
1 , θ
M
2


< 2 hold, so that the alignment of second-best
eﬀort levels with the ranking obtained at ﬁrst-best under condition (4) necessarily holds.
C.2 Pooling and exclusion
The principal can also resort to contracts involving pooling of types and eventually exclusion of some
workers’ types.
Observe that the fully separating and fully participating solution is characterized by the lower bound
γSBM , which comes from the condition eSBMHH > e
SBM
LL . Therefore, if γ ≤ γSBM , the principal is forced to
oﬀer the same contract to both types HH and LL. Likewise, the fully separating and fully participating
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solution is characterized by the upper bound γSBM , which corresponds to eSBMLL > e
SBM
HL . And if
γ ≥ γSBM we always expect a pooling contract where types HL and LL receive the same oﬀer. We refer
the reader to Appendix D.4.2 for the detailed analysis of the ﬁrst situation, while we consider the second
one in what follows.
Suppose that there’s pooling between non motivated types and that eLL = eHL = ep. Then the
ordering of eﬀort levels is eLH > eHH > eLL = eHL = ep and the relevant downward incentive constraints
that one expects to be binding are ICLHvsHH and ICHHvsLL (or ICHHvsHL, which is equivalent) together
with participation constraint PCHL. Since here worker types LL and HL receive the same wage and
provide the same eﬀort, uLL > uHL necessarily holds. The wages are
wLL = wHL = wp =
1
2
θe2p, (22)
wHH =
1
2
θe2HH − γeHH +γep  
Info rent worker HH
and
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+
1
2
∆θe2HH + γep  
Info-rent worker LH
.
Substituting the wages into the objective function of the principal and maximizing yields
eLH = e
SBM
LH = e
FB
LH = 1 + γ,
eHH = e
SBM
HH =
(1− ν) (1 + γ)
(θ − ν)
and
eLL = eHL = e
SBM
p =
(1− µ)− µγ
(1− µ) θ = e
BM
HL (23)
Note that the expressions for eLH and eHH are the same as in Case M , meaning that no distortion at
the top is veriﬁed and that the eﬀort of individual HH is lower than the corresponding ﬁrst-best level.
Moreover, eLH > eHH still holds. Concerning e
SBM
p , it is the same as in Benchmark BM, it is strictly
positive for γ < γBM and such that eHH > e
SBM
p holds if and only if
γ >
ν (1− µ)∆θ
θ (1− ν) + µν∆θ = γp
where γp < γ
SBM always holds.
We are then able to state the following result.
Result 2 Full participation and pooling between types LL and HL when motivation prevails.
The solution to the principal’s program SB which entails full participation and pooling between types LL
and HL, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eHH > eLL = eHL > 0, and which is such
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that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (17), (18) and (23) exists if and only if γp < γ < min

γBM , 1

with
γp ≡ ν(1−µ)∆θθ(1−ν)+µν∆θ
γBM ≡ (1−µ)
µ
being γBM < 1 for µ > 12 .
The conditions of existence of an equilibrium with full participation and pooling of workers HL and
LL are less stringent than the ones we obtained in Result 1 because the requirement eSBMHL < e
SBM
LL
is no longer relevant. Also, the pooled eﬀort eSBMp is always in-between expressions (19) and (20): in
particular, eSBMHL > e
SBM
p > e
SBM
LL holds if and only if γ > γ
SBM .
Note that γBM ≥ 1 if and only if µ ≤ 12 , therefore the principal always proposes a pooling contract to
types LL and HL when motivation is suﬃciently high (i.e. for γ ≥ γSBM) and the probability of being
motivated is suﬃciently low (i.e. for µ ≤ 12). Conversely, when µ > 12 and γBM < 1, then for γ ≥ γBM
the principal is expected to exclude type HL since the probability of motivated types is high and the
productivity loss from type HL is low.
As for exclusion, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for full participation requires in general that,
for any type ij, the expected proﬁt from employing type ij be higher than the expected information rents
that have to be paid to her mimickers; this condition is satisﬁed as long as type ij’s eﬀort is strictly
positive. However, the condition eij > 0 might call for some restrictions on the parameter space, as
occurred in Benchmark BM (see footnote 16).
In order to derive the conditions for existence and to characterize the contract with exclusion of
type HL, we proceed as in the case with full participation, but we obviously drop worker HL from the
principal’s maximization program SB and omit the monotonicity condition eLL > eHL. Since the upper
bound γSBM of the existence range for an equilibrium with full participation comes precisely from the
constraint eSBMLL > e
SBM
HL , the range for the existence of a separating equilibrium with exclusion of HL
is broader on the right side with respect to the interval

γSBM , γSBM

. Moreover, the optimal eﬀort
levels of the remaining types are given by the same expressions from (17) to (19), even with exclusion.
Instead, the optimal wages of the remaining types will be lower than expressions from (10) to (12), since
the portions of the three information rents that depend on eHL disappear.
Result 3 Exclusion of type HL when motivation prevails. The solution to the principal’s program
SB, which entails separation and exclusion of type HL, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH
> eHH > eLL > eHL = 0 and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions from (17) to (19),
exists if and only if θ < min
	
θ
M
1 , θ
M
2


and γSBM < γ < γ0 ≡ ν(1−µ)µ .
Up to now we have identiﬁed all possible classes of solutions to the principal’s program SB, when
motivation prevails, and their corresponding (possibly overlapping) existence regions. Actually, there still
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remains to characterize the solution when there is bunching between intermediate types HH and LL and
we refer the reader to Appendix D.4.2 for the analysis of such a situation. In order to single out the
optimal contract chosen by the principal, we still have one step to go: when diﬀerent solutions coexist,
we must pick the one that yields the highest proﬁts to the ﬁrm and discard the others. This is precisely
what we do next.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that the solution entailing full participation and full separation of types dominates
(meaning that it provides higher proﬁts to the principal) both full separation but exclusion of at least
worker HL and full participation but pooling of two workers’ type. Moreover, we prove that full partici-
pation and pooling of two diﬀerent types dominates full separation and exclusion of (at least) worker HL,
whenever the two solutions coexist. We consider the situation in which motivation prevails over ability
(Case M); the same line of reasoning applies to Case A as well, which is therefore omitted.
Start with the comparison between full participation and full separation of types and exclusion of at
least worker HL. We must evaluate the costs and beneﬁts from participation of the worst worker type
HL. The principal’s beneﬁt from employing worker HL is the expected proﬁt
(1− µ) (1− ν) (eHL −wHL) , (24)
whereas the cost from participation of HL is represented by the information rents paid to the three
remaining workers’ types, which add up to
1
2
(1− (1− µ) (1− ν))∆θe2HL (25)
Thus, the principal prefers full participation to exclusion of type HL if and only if (24) is strictly
greater than (25). Taking into account expression (9) for the wage wHL in Case M , the inequality
reduces to 2eSBMHL > e
SBM
HL , which is obviously satisﬁed as long as e
SBM
HL > 0. Alternatively, substituting
both expression (9) for the wage and expression (20) for eHL in (24) and (25), we obtain that full
separation and full participation dominates full separation and exclusion of type HL if and only if
θ− (1− (1− µ) (1− ν)) > 0. This is the denominator of eHL in expression (20). The previous inequality
says that the eﬀort cost of a low ability type θ must be larger than the joint probability of hiring types
that are overall more eﬃcient than HL. This condition always holds in our setting, given that θ > 1.
Similar conclusions can be drawn considering exclusion of both workers HL and LL.
Consider now the comparison between full separation and full participation of types and full partic-
ipation but pooling of workers HH and LL (as said, this solution is considered in detail in Appendix
D.4.2 but we anticipate some ﬁndings here for expositional convenience). Now the trade-oﬀ between costs
and beneﬁts from full separation becomes less clear, so let us resort directly to the comparison between
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the principal’s proﬁts under the two solutions. The principal’s payoﬀs under full separation and full
participation of types are
πSBMFS,FP =
1
2

νµ (1 + γ)2 + µ (1−ν)
2(1+γ)2
θ−ν
+ (ν(1−µ)−µγ)
2
(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))−µθ +
(1−ν)2(1−µ)2
θ−(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))

while, under full participation but pooling of workers HH and LL, proﬁts amount to
πSBMFP,HH=LL =
1
2

νµ (1 + γ)2 + (ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν)−γµν)
2
ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν) +
(1−ν)2(1−µ)2
θ−(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))

It is immediate to check that πSBMFS,FP > π
SBM
FP,HH=LL always holds.
Consider now the comparison between full separation and full participation of types and full par-
ticipation but pooling of workers HL and LL (see Appendix C.2). The principal’s payoﬀs under full
participation but pooling of workers HL and LL are given by
πSBMFP,HL=LL =
1
2

νµ (1 + γ)2 + µ(1−ν)
2(1+γ)2
(θ−ν) +
((1−µ)−µγ)2
θ(1−µ)

and, again, it is straightforward to check that πSBMFS,FP > π
SBM
FP,HL=LL always holds.
Finally, consider the comparison between full participation but pooling of workers HL and LL and
full separation but exclusion of worker HL. Since both solutions are dominated by full separation and
full participation, they can be candidate optimal contracts only above γSBM . The principal’s proﬁts at
the latter solution are
πSBMFS,HL=0 =
1
2

νµ (1 + γ)2 + µ(1−ν)
2(1+γ)2
(θ−ν) +
(ν(1−µ)−µγ)2
ν(1−µ)−µ(θ−1)

and πSBMFP,HL=LL > π
SBM
FS,HL=0 if and only if
((1− µ)− µγ) eSBMp > (ν (1− µ)− µγ) eSBMLL .
The above inequality is always veriﬁed since ((1− µ)− µγ) > (ν (1− µ)− µγ) always holds and eSBMp >
eSBMLL is true above γ
SBM .
Note that the comparison between full participation but pooling of workers HH and LL and full
separation but exclusion of worker HL is meaningless because, below γSBM , it is never feasible to
separate types HH and LL. So we are done.
C.4 Optimal contracts when motivation prevails
Considering Proposition 1, Results from 1 to 3 and Result 13 in Appendix D.4.2, it is now possible to
characterize the optimal contracts when motivation prevails.
Result 4 When motivation prevails, the optimal contracts proposed by the principal are as follows:
(i) Full participation and pooling between types HH and LL and ICLLvsLH binding (characterized in
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Result 13) is implemented if and only if θ < θ
M
1 and γ
∗ ≤ γ < γSBM .
(ii) Full participation and full separation of types (characterized in Result 1) is implemented if and only
if θ < min
	
θ
M
1 , θ
M
2


and γSBM ≤ γ ≤ γSBM .
(iii) Full participation and pooling between types LL and HL (characterized in Result 2) is implemented
if and only if θ < θ
M
1 and γ
SBM ≤ γ ≤ minγBM , 1 .
(iv) Full separation and exclusion of type HL (characterized in Result 3) is implemented if and only if
µ > 12 , θ < θ
M
1 and γ
BM < γ ≤ 1.
D Ability prevails (Case A)
When ability prevails, condition (8) holds and eLL > eHH together with eLL+ eHH ≥ 2γ∆θ must be
satisﬁed. In line with Observation 2, in order to ﬁnd a fully separating and fully participating solu-
tion to the principal’s problem SB take the participation constraint PCHL and the following incentive
constraints: ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHH or eventually ICLLvsHL (whichever one binds ﬁrst), ICHHvsHL or
ICHHvsLL (again whichever one binds ﬁrst). Note that all incentive compatibility constraints considered
are downward constraints except for ICHHvsLL which points upwards. Since ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsLL
cannot be simultaneously binding at a separating equilibrium, then the possible situations are the fol-
lowing: (A.1) all downward local ICs are binding and thus ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsHL hold
with equality, as shown in Figure 2a; (A.2) the downward local constraints ICLHvsLL and ICHHvsHL
and the global downward constraint ICLLvsHL are all binding, as shown in Figure 2b; (A.3) constraints
ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHL and the upward ICHHvsLL hold with equality, as shown in Figure 2c.
Such three possible cases will be analyzed in detail in what follows.
D.1 Case A.1
D.1.1 Full separation and full participation
This represents the most intuitive case where all downward local ICs are binding and occurs when γ is
suﬃciently low so that worker HH receives a relatively high salary in exchange for a relatively low eﬀort,
and such a contract is attracting for type LL. Solving the binding constraints for salaries, one obtains
the following wage schedules and informational rents
wHL =
1
2
θe2HL, (26)
wHH =
1
2
θe2HH − γeHH +γeHL  
Info rent worker HH
, (27)
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wLL =
1
2
e2LL+
1
2
∆θe2HH − γeHH + γeHL  
Info rent worker LL
(28)
and
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+γeLL +
1
2
∆θe2HH − γeHH + γeHL  
Info rent worker LH
. (29)
All information rents, except the one of type HL, are positive and have the usual cumulative struc-
ture. They all include at least one expression of the form γeij as in Benchmark BM where asymmetric
information concerns motivation only. Only type LL receives an information rent which also depends
on the diﬀerence in ability ∆θ: this comes from the fact that this program embeds the two subcases in
Benchmark BM and links them through constraint ICLLvsHH . Type LH cumulates this rent too when
trying to mimic LL.
This case is peculiar because an additional constraint needs to be satisﬁed, which comes from ex-
pression (28). The rent accruing to type LL when mimicking HH must be positive and this occurs if
and only if eHH >
2γ
∆θ (which is more restrictive than condition 8).
28 In diﬀerent words, only when γ is
suﬃciently low, does type LL beneﬁt from mimicking type HH. Otherwise, type LL will rather prefer to
mimic type HL as in Case A.2 and Case A.3 that follow.
Substituting the wage schedules into the objective function and deriving with respect to eﬀort levels
we obtain
eSBA1LH = 1 + γ (30)
eSBA1LL =
(1− µ)− µγ
(1− µ) = e
BM
LL , (31)
eSBA1HH =
(1− ν)µ+ (1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) γ
(1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) θ − ν (32)
and
eSBA1HL =
(1− ν) (1− µ)− (1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) γ
(1− ν) (1− µ) θ . (33)
The standard result of no distortion at the top and downward distortion in eﬀort levels for all other agent’s
types is obtained. Note that eSBA1LL is equal to the eﬀort level we obtained for type LL in Benchmark BM .
Instead, the eﬀort levels required from the less productive workers (types HH and HL) are characterized
by a larger downward distortion than in program BM because of the cumulative eﬀect of informational
rents.
Also observe that eSBA1LH and e
SBA1
HH are strictly positive, while e
SBA1
LL > 0 if and only if γ < γ
BM ,
and eSBA1HL > 0 if and only if
γ <
(1− ν) (1− µ)
(1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) = γ
SBA1
1 .
28Note that condition eHH >
2γ
∆θ
implies condition eHH >
2γ
θ
. Hence if LL receives a positive information rent when
mimicking HH, then it must be that type HH is not a volunteer and that she is experiencing a net cost from providing
eﬀort.
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Actually, eSBA1LL > 0 always holds when µ ≤ 12 or when eSBA1HL is strictly positive, since eSBA1HL > 0 implies
eSBA1LL > 0 (being γ
BM > γSBA11 ).
As for the monotonicity conditions, it can be checked that eSBA1LH > e
SBA1
LL always holds, that e
SBA1
LL >
eSBA1HH is true for
γ < (1−µ)(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))∆θ
µ(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))∆θ+(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν)) = γ
SBA1
2
and that inequalities eSBA1LH > e
SBA1
HH , e
SBA1
LL > e
SBA1
HL and e
SBA1
HH +e
SBA1
LL >
2γ
∆θ all hold when γ < γ
SBA1
2 .
Note that γSBA12 < γ
SBA1
1 if and only if
θ <
µ (1− ν (1− ν)) + ν (1− µ)
ν (1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) ≡ θ3.
Finally, eSBA1HH > e
SBA1
HL for
γ >
ν (1− ν) (1− µ)∆θ
(1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) (θ − ν) = γ
SBA1
where it is always the case that γSBA1 < min

γSBA11 , γ
SBA1
2

.
In addition, it must be true that eSBA1HH >
2γ
∆θ . Such condition is equivalent to
γ <
µ (1− ν)∆θ
ν∆θ + µ (1− ν) (θ + 1) = γ
SBA1
3 ,
where γSBA13 > γ
SBA1 holds if and only if µ > ν1+ν = µ0. Thus, µ > µ0 is a necessary condition ensuring
that the two requirements eSBA1HH > e
SBA1
HL and e
SBA1
HH >
2γ
∆θ can both be met.
29 Finally, γSBA13 < γ
SBA1
1
if and only if
θ <
µ (1 + ν)− ν
(2µ− 1) (1− (1− µ) (1− ν)) ≡ θ4,
which is always the case for µ ≤ 12 . Observe that γSBA13 < γSBA12 if and only if µ <
(1−2ν)+
√
1+4ν(1−ν)
4(1−ν) ≡
µ2, with µ2 >
1
2 and that θ3 < θ4 if and only if µ < µ2.
We are then able to state the following result.
Result 5 Full participation and full separation when ability prevails and ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsHL
are binding. The solution to the principal’s program SB, which entails full participation, full separation
of types and constraints ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsHL binding, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition
eLH > eLL > eHH > eHL > 0 and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions from (30) to
(33) exists and represents the optimal contract if and only if µ > ν1+ν ≡ µ0 and γSBA1 < γ < γSBA1 with
γSBA1 ≡ ν(1−ν)(1−µ)∆θ(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))(θ−ν)
γSBA1 = min

γSBA11 , γ
SBA1
2 , γ
SBA1
3

29Full participation and full separation in Case A.1 is possible only if µ > µ0, or if the probability of motivated workers
is suﬃciently high, implying that information rents are not too costly.
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and
γSBA11 ≡ (1−ν)(1−µ)(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))
γSBA12 ≡ (1−µ)(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))∆θµ(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))∆θ+(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))
γSBA13 ≡ µ(1−ν)∆θ(ν∆θ+µ(1−ν)(θ+1))
.
Finally note that γ∗ > max

γSBA11 , γ
SBA1
2 , γ
SBA1
3

is always true, therefore Case A.1 with full
participation and full separation is always a subset of the ﬁrst-best state of the world in which condition
(3) holds.
To better characterize the optimal contracts in Case A.1, we add the following.
Remark 10 At the optimal contract with full participation and full separation under Case A.1, the
ordering of wages is
wSBA1LH > w
SBA1
LL > w
SBA1
HH > w
SBA1
HL > 0
and the ordering of information rents (indirect utilities) is
uSBA1LH > u
SBA1
LL > u
SBA1
HH > u
SBA1
HL = 0.
Case A.1 represents the unique instance in which wages and information rents always have the same
ordering as eﬀort levels. As in Case M , here the bidimensional screening problem is equivalent to the
unidimensional screening one with four types, the unidimensional parameter of private information being
the workers’ overall cost of eﬀort exertion.
D.1.2 Pooling and exclusion
In light of Proposition 1, the optimal contract will always be characterized by full participation and full
separation of types, except when the former solution is not viable, in which case pooling and possibly
exclusion will also be part of the optimal contract.
First of all consider pooling. Observe that the lower bound γSBA1 corresponds to condition eSBA1HH >
eSBA1HL . Thus, if γ ≤ γSBA1, then we expect a pooling equilibrium where types HH and HL receive
the same contract. Suppose that there’s pooling between the less productive types and that eHH =
eHL = ep holds. Then the ordering of eﬀort levels is eLH > eLL > ep > 0 and the relevant downward
incentive constraints that one assumes to be binding are ICLHvsLL and ICLLvsHL (or ICLLvsHH , which
is equivalent) with participation constraint PCHL. Since here the incentive constraints ICLLvsHH and
ICLLvsHL are both binding by construction, we do not need any condition on the sum of eHH and eHL.
Moreover, since the two types of workers receive the same wage and provide the same eﬀort, uHH > uHL
necessarily holds. The wages are
wHH = wHL = wp =
1
2
θe2p,
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wLL =
1
2
e2LL +
1
2
∆θe2p  
Info rent worker LL
and
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+γeLL +
1
2
∆θe2p  
Info rent worker LH
.
Substituting the salaries into the objective function of the principal and maximizing with respect to eﬀort
levels yields
eSBA1LH = 1 + γ,
eSBA1LL =
(1− µ)− µγ
(1− µ) = e
BM
LL
and
eHH = eHL = e
SBA1
p =
(1− ν)
(θ − ν) = e
BA
HL (34)
Note that the expressions for eLH and eLL are the same as in Case A.1 (and A.2 that follows) with full
separation, meaning that no distortion at the top is veriﬁed and that the eﬀort of individual LL is lower
than the corresponding ﬁrst-best level. Moreover, eLH > eLL still holds. Concerning e
SBA1
p , which is
strictly positive, we expect that this eﬀort lies in-between the eﬀort exerted by types HH and HL in Case
A.1 with full separation. One can easily check that eSBA1HH < e
SBA1
p < e
SBA1
HL if and only if γ < γ
SBA1.
Finally, eSBA1LL > e
SBA1
p if and only if
γ <
(1− µ)∆θ
µ (θ − ν) = γp
where γp > γ
SBA1 always holds.
Now consider the upper bounds (recall that condition γ < γSBA11 is equivalent to e
SBA1
HL > 0, that
inequality γ < γSBA12 is equivalent to e
SBA1
LL > e
SBA1
HH and ﬁnally that γ < γ
SBA1
3 ensures that requirement
eSBA1HH >
2γ
∆θ holds): if γ ≥ γSBA1, we expect an equilibrium in which either types HH and LL are pooled
together or exclusion occurs or both.30
Result 6 (i) Full participation and pooling between types HH and HL when ability prevails.
The solution to the principal’s program SB which entails full participation, pooling between types HH and
HL, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eLL > eHH = eHL = ep > 0 and which is such
that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (30), (31) and (34) exists if and only if 0 < γ ≤ γp ≡ (1−µ)∆θµ(θ−ν)
and represents the optimal contract when 0 < γ ≤ γSBA1.
(ii) Full participation and pooling between types HH and LL when ability prevails. The
solution to the principal’s program SB which entails full participation, pooling between types HH and LL
30We refer the reader to Appendix D.4.1 for the detailed analysis of this situation.
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and ICHHvsHL binding, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eHH = eLL = ep > eHL > 0
and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (30), (33) and
eHH = eLL ≡ eSBA1p =
(ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν)) (1 + γ)
νµ∆θ + (ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν)) θ ,
represents the optimal contract only if γSBA1 = γSBA11 and γSBA1 < γ < min

γSBPa, γSBA11

with
γSBPa ≡ (ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))∆θ2νµ∆θ+(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))(θ+1) .
Note that when γSBA1 = γSBA11 and γ
SBA1
1 < γ < min

γSBA12 , γ
SBA1
3

, the principal will necessarily
exclude worker HL. This would lead us to consider alternative solutions where either full separation but
exclusion of type HL (and where ICLLvsHH and PCHH are binding), or pooling of types HH and LL
and exclusion of type HL, or else exclusion of both types HL and HH are implemented.31
D.2 Case A.2
D.2.1 Full separation and full participation
As in Case A.3 which follows, type LL is willing to mimic HL rather than type HH. This occurs since
motivation γ is high enough so that type HH is asked to make a relatively high eﬀort in exchange for a
relatively low wage and her contract is not appealing to type LL. As a consequence no type is willing to
mimic worker HH and her eﬀort is not distorted.
Interestingly, this is the unique case where neither the incentive compatibility constraint of type HH
versus type LL nor the one of type LL versus HH are binding.
The salaries of types HH and HL are the same as in Case A.1, and given by expressions (27) and
(26) respectively, whereas the salary of type LL has the same expression as in Cases M and A.3 (see
equations 10 and 15); the other relevant wage level is now
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+γeLL +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker LH
.
The information rent of worker LL is formed by one term only, 12∆θe
2
HL (as in Benchmark BA, Case M
and Case A.3 that follows) which depends on the eﬀort exerted by worker HL, while no rent depending
on eHH appears: this is because type LL mimics type HL directly, without “going through” type HH.
For the same reason, information rents accruing to both types LH and LL are “shorter” than in Case
A.1, as the paths of binding incentive constraints in Figure 2b show. Also the information rent of type
HH only depends on the eﬀort provided by of worker HL, however in wHH the rent is γeHL (as the one
31 In the region γ ≥ γSBA1, we do not provide the full characterization of the solution (available upon request though)
because several diﬀerent cases might arise and the analysis becomes cumbersome without being very insightful.
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Benchmark BM). Thus, we can interpret this speciﬁc sub-case as a program that is in-between Case A.1
and Case A.3.
Substituting the wage functions into the principal’s expected proﬁts and deriving with respect to
eﬀort levels, we obtain
eSBA2LH = 1 + γ, (35)
eSBA2LL =
(1− µ)− γµ
(1− µ) = e
SBA1
LL = e
BM
LL , (36)
eSBA2HH =
1 + γ
θ
= eFBHH (37)
and
eSBA2HL =
(1− ν) ((1− µ)− γµ)
ν∆θ + θ (1− µ) (1− ν) . (38)
Note that eSBA2LL has the same expression as e
SBA1
LL and as e
BM
LL in Benchmark BM with adverse
selection on motivation. As already mentioned, both eSBA2LH and e
SBA2
HH are equal to their ﬁrst-best
levels, while both eSBA2LL and e
SBA2
HL are distorted downwards and e
SBA2
HL has a larger distortion than the
corresponding term in program BM .
Also observe that both eSBA2HL > 0 and e
SBA2
LL > 0 hold provided that γ < γ
BM , that eSBA2LH > e
SBA2
LL >
eSBA2HL and e
SBA2
HH > e
SBA2
HL always hold, while e
SBA2
LL > e
SBA2
HH if and only if
γ <
(1− µ)∆θ
1 + µ∆θ
= γSBA21 .
It is easy to check that the condition γ < γSBA21 implies both e
SBA2
HL > 0 and e
SBA2
LL > 0, being
γSBA21 < γ
BM , and also that γSBA21 < γ
SBA1
2 always holds, being the requirement e
SBA2
LL > e
SBA2
HH = e
FB
HH
more restrictive than eSBA1LL > e
SBA1
HH , the corresponding requisite in Case A.1. Then, all monotonicity
conditions are satisﬁed provided that γ < γSBA21 . Moreover, condition γ < γ
SBA2
1 suﬃces for e
SBA2
HH +
eSBA2LL ≥ 2γ∆θ .
There remains to check that incentive constraint ICLLvsHL is binding rather than ICLLvsHH and
that ICHHvsHL is binding rather than ICHHvsLL, which amounts to eHL+ eHH ≤ 2γ∆θ ≤ eHL+ eLL. As
for inequality eSBA2HL + e
SBA2
LL ≥ 2γ∆θ , it holds if and only if
γ ≤ ∆θ(1−µ)(∆θ(1−µ(1−ν))+2(1−µ)(1−ν))
2(1−µ)2(1−ν)+∆θ2µ(1−µ(1−ν))+2∆θ(1−µ)
= γSBA22 ,
conversely eSBA2HH + e
SBA2
HL ≤ 2γ∆θ holds if and only if
γ ≥ ∆θ(2θ(1−µ)(1−ν)+ν∆θ)(ν∆θ+θ(1−µ)(1−ν))(θ+1)+θ∆θ(1−ν)µ = γSBA2 ,
whereby a solution exists for γSBA2 ≤ γ < minγSBA21 , γSBA22  ≡ γSBA2.Now, γSBA2 < γSBA22 < γSBA21
is true if and only if µ < 12 and
θ >
(1− µ (1 + ν))
(1− 2µ) (1− µ (1− ν)) = θ
A2,
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hence a solution with full separation and full participation under Case A.2 does not exist for µ ≥ 12 .
We are then able to state the following result.
Result 7 Full participation and full separation when ability prevails and ICLLvsHL and ICHHvsHL
are binding. A solution to the principal’s program SB, which entails full participation, full separa-
tion of types and ICLLvsHL and ICHHvsHL binding, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH >
eLL > eHH > eHL > 0 and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions from (35) to (38)
exists and represents the optimal contract if and only if µ < 12 , θ > θ
A2 and γSBA2 ≤ γ < γSBA2, with
γSBA2 ≡ ∆θ(2θ(1−µ)(1−ν)+ν∆θ)(ν∆θ+θ(1−µ)(1−ν))(θ+1)+θ∆θ(1−ν)µ
γSBA2 ≡ ∆θ(1−µ)(∆θ(1−µ(1−ν))+2(1−µ)(1−ν))
2(1−µ)2(1−ν)+∆θ2µ(1−µ(1−ν))+2∆θ(1−µ)
θA2 ≡ (1−µ(1+ν))(1−2µ)(1−µ(1−ν))
.
Note that a fully separating and fully participating equilibrium in Case A.2 only exist if µ < 12 , that
is if the probability of motivated workers is suﬃciently low. In fact, the information rents of workers HH
and LH depend on γ, which is relatively large in Case A.2. Thus, this optimal contract exists if the total
number of information rents that the principal pays to motivated workers is not too high.
Finally, observe that γSBA22 = γ
SBA2 < γ∗ always holds, thus implying that this solution is attained
when, at the ﬁrst-best, condition (3) holds.
Looking at optimal wages and information rents we can state the following.
Remark 11 At the optimal contract with full participation and full separation under Case A.2, the
ranking of wages is
wSBA2LH > w
SBA2
LL > w
SBA2
HH > w
SBA2
HL > 0
and the ordering of information rents is
uSBA2LH > u
SBA2
HH > u
SBA2
LL > u
SBA2
HL = 0.
Wages have the same ordering as eﬀort levels, while the ranking of information rents of intermediate
types is reversed (and is the same as in Case M).
D.2.2 Pooling and exclusion
What happens when full participation and full separation is not viable? Below γSBA2, one expects the
principal to exclude the less eﬃcient types, namely HL and possibly HH too, while above γSBA2, one
expects to have a pooling equilibrium where types LL and HH are given the same contract and, possibly,
the worst type HL is excluded. Again, we refer the reader to Appendix D.4.2 for the detailed analysis of
the latter situation and we concentrate here on the ﬁrst one, exclusion.
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Suppose that the principal excludes typeHL and oﬀers her the null contract. The principal’s program
must be slightly modiﬁed with respect to full participation, the main diﬀerences being that monotonicity
constraint eHH > eHL is omitted and that PCHH (rather than PCHL) is assumed to be binding. More-
over, the requirement that incentive constraint ICLLvsHL be binding and ICLLvsHH be slack reduces to
the need that PCLL binds and that eSBA2HH ≤ 2γ∆θ holds, which is true if and only if
γ ≥ ∆θ
θ + 1
= γSBA2,
where γSBA2 < γSBA2 always holds when µ < 12 . Furthermore, the requirement that incentive constraint
ICHHvsHL be binding and ICHHvsLL be slack reduces to PCHH being binding and to e
SBA2
LL ≥ 2γ∆θ ,
which is true for
γ ≤ (1− µ)∆θ
2 (1− µ) + µ∆θ = γ
SBA2
,
with γSBA2 < min
	
γ
SBA2
, γSBA2


. Hence a solution characterized by exclusion of type HL, separation
of the remaining types and both PCLL and PCHH binding exists for γ
SBA2 ≤ γ < min
	
γ
SBA2
, γSBA2


.
Result 8 (i) Separation and exclusion of (at least) type HL when ability prevails. The solution
to the principal’s program SB, which entails separation but exclusion of type HL, both PCHH and PCLL
binding, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eLL > eHH > eHL = 0 and which is such that
eﬀort levels are given by expressions from (35) to (37) represents the optimal contract when µ < 12 and
γSBA2 ≤ γ ≤ min
	
γSBA2, γ
SBA2


, where
γSBA2 ≡ ∆θ(θ+1)
γ
SBA2 ≡ (1−µ)∆θ2(1−µ)+µ∆θ
.
The solution characterized by exclusion of both types HL and HH represents the optimal contract either
when γ < γSBA2 or when γ
SBA2
< γ < γSBA2.
(ii) Full participation and Pooling between HH and LL when ability prevails and ICLLvsHL is
binding. The solution to the principal’s program SB which entails full participation and pooling between
types LL and HH and ICLLvsHL binding, which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (35),
(38) and
eLL = eHH ≡ eSBA2p =
(ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν))− γµν
(ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν)) = e
SBM
p (39)
represents the optimal contract when γ ≥ γSBPb, where
γSBPb ≡ (ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))∆θ(∆θ+2(1−ν)(1−µ))(θ−(1−(1−ν)(1−µ)))(2(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))+µν∆θ) > γSBA2 .
(iii) Pooling between HH and LL and exclusion of HL when ability prevails. The solution
to the principal’s program SB which entails pooling between types LL and HH, exclusion of type HL
and PCLL binding, which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (35) and (39) represents the
optimal contract when γSBA2 ≤ γ < γSBPb.
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Observe that Result 8 (ii) describes precisely the same pooling equilibrium obtained in Case M for
motivation levels below the threshold γSBM .
D.3 Case A.3
D.3.1 Full separation and full participation
Suppose that constraints ICLHvsLL, ICHHvsLL, ICLLvsHL and PCHL are all binding and that inequality
eHL + eLL ≤ 2γ∆θ ≤ eHH + eLL holds. Substituting the expressions for the wage levels from (13) to (16)
given in Section 5.2.1 into the principal’s proﬁts and maximizing with respect to eﬀort levels, yields
eSBA3LH = 1 + γ, (40)
eSBA3LL =
ν (1− µ)− µγ
(µ (1− ν) + ν (1− µ))− µ (1− ν) θ , (41)
eSBA3HH =
1 + γ
θ
= eSBA2HH = e
FB
HH (42)
and
eSBA3HL =
(1− µ) (1− ν)
θ − (1− (1− µ) (1− ν)) = e
SBM
HL . (43)
All eﬀort levels are always strictly positive, except for eSBA3LL . In order for e
SBA3
LL to be positive and
to be a maximum of the principal’s expected proﬁts, it is necessary to impose that both the numerator
and the denominator of its expression be positive: the numerator of eSBA3LL is positive for γ < γ0 (see
expression 21) and the denominator of eSBA3LL is positive when
θ <
(µ (1− ν) + ν (1− µ))
µ (1− ν) = θ
A3
.
Note that θ
A3
> 2 if and only if µ < ν, thus under Assumption 2 the requirement θ < θ
A3
is always
satisﬁed when µ < ν.
As for the monotonicity conditions, it must be that eSBA3LL > e
SBA3
HH , which holds if and only if
γ <
(µ (1− ν) + ν (1− µ))∆θ
µνθ + (µ (1− ν) + ν (1− µ)) = γ
SBA3
where γSBA3 < γ∗ and γSBA3 < γ0 are always true. Moreover, e
SBA3
HH > e
SBA3
HL always holds and
eSBA3LL > e
SBA3
HL is always satisﬁed when e
SBA3
LL > e
SBA3
HH is (namely when γ < γ
SBA3). Notice that eSBA3LL
is distorted downwards if and only if
γ > (1− ν)∆θ = γSBA31
where γSBA31 < γ
SBA3. Hence if motivation is not too high, Case A.3 could be compatible with an upward
distortion in the eﬀort of the productive but non-motivated worker LL.
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Consider now the additional constraints eLL+ eHL ≤ 2γ∆θ ≤ eLL+ eHH . As for 2γ∆θ ≤ eLL+ eHH , it is
always satisﬁed provided that γ < γSBA3, while eLL + eHL ≤ 2γ∆θ holds if and only if
γ ≥ ∆θ(1−µ)(2ν(1−ν)(1−µ)+(ν−µ(1−ν)
2)∆θ)
(θ−(1−(1−µ)(1−ν)))(2ν(1−µ)−µ(1−2ν)∆θ) = γ
SBA3
where γSBA3 > γSBA31 (implying that e
SBA3
LL is always distorted downwards when full participation and
full separation is possible) and γSBA3 < γSBA3 when
θ >
µ (1− ν) + ν (1− µ)− νµ ((1− (1− µ) (1− ν)))
µ (1− ν) + ν (1− µ)− νµ ((1 + (1− µ) (1− ν))) = θ
A3,
with θA3 < θ
A3
if and only if
µ <
(4ν−ν2−1)−
√
((4ν−ν2−1))2−4ν(3ν−2)(1−ν)
2(3ν−2)(1−ν) = µ1 >
1
2
(for ν = 23 or if and only if µ < µ4ν−ν2−1 for ν = 23).
We are thus able to provide the conditions under which the optimal contract with full separation and
full participation is implemented.
Result 9 Full participation and full separation when ability prevails and ICHHvsLL and ICLLvsHL
are binding. The solution to the principal’s program SB, which entails full participation, full separa-
tion of types and ICHHvsLL and ICLLvsHL binding, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH >
eLL > eHH > eHL > 0 and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions from (40) to (43),
exists and represents the optimal contract if and only if µ < µ1, θ
A3 < θ < θ
A3
and γSBA3 ≤ γ < γSBA3,
with
γSBA3 ≡ ∆θ(1−µ)(2ν(1−ν)(1−µ)+(ν−µ(1−ν)
2)∆θ)
(θ−(1−(1−µ)(1−ν)))(2ν(1−µ)−µ(1−2ν)∆θ)
γSBA3 ≡ ∆θ(µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ))
µνθ+(µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ))
µ1 ≡ (
4ν−ν2−1)−
√
((4ν−ν2−1))2−4ν(3ν−2)(1−ν)
2(3ν−2)(1−ν) >
1
2
θ
A3 ≡ (µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ))
µ(1−ν)
θA3 ≡ (µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ)−νµ((1−(1−µ)(1−ν))))(µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ)−νµ((1+(1−µ)(1−ν))))
.
D.3.2 Pooling and exclusion
What happens when full participation and full separation is not viable? Above γSBA3, one expects
to have a pooling equilibrium where types LL and HH are given the same contract. And also below
γSBA3 one still ﬁnds that this solution is relevant. Again, we refer the reader to Appendix D.4.2 for the
conditions of existence of a pooling equilibrium and we focus attention here on optimal contracts.
Result 10 Full participation and Pooling between HH and LL when productivity prevails
and ICLLvsHL is binding. The solution to the principal’s program SB which is characterized by full
participation and pooling between types LL and HH and ICLLvsHL binding, by eﬀort levels described
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by expressions (40), (43) and (39) represents the optimal contract when γSBA3 ≤ γ ≤ γ∗ and when
γSBPb ≤ γ ≤ γSBA3.
Below γSBA3 one also ﬁnds pooling between types HH and LL and exclusion of type HL and (pos-
sibly) a solution with separation but exclusion of type HL. Interestingly, in the latter case, it is possible
to have an upward distortion of the eﬀort required to type LL, but not so important as to allow for a
pooling equilibrium where types LH and LL are given the same contract.
Suppose that type HL is left out. In this circumstance, the optimal levels of eﬀort are the same as
under full participation, except for eHL = 0, and all relevant constraints are satisﬁed whenever the chain
of inequalities eLL ≤ 2γ∆θ ≤ eLL + eHH holds.
Now, 2γ∆θ ≤ eSBA3LL + eSBA3HH is always satisﬁed when γ < γSBA3, whereas eSBA3LL ≤ 2γ∆θ is true if and
only if
γ ≥ ν (1− µ)∆θ
(2ν (1− µ)− µ∆θ (1− 2ν)) = γ
SBA3
where γSBA3 < γSBA3 always holds and where γSBA3 > γSBA31 if and only if ν >
1
2 . Hence a solution
with exclusion of type HL under Case A.3 exists for γSBA3 ≤ γ < γSBA3 and θ < θA3. Observe that,
when ν < 12 and γ
SBA3 ≤ γ < γSBA31 , the solution entails an upward distortion in the level of eﬀort
provided by type LL.
Result 11 (i) Pooling between HH and LL and exclusion of type HL when ability prevails
and PCLL is binding. A solution to the principal’s program SB with pooling between types LL and
HH and exclusion of type HL, with PCLL binding and with eﬀort levels described by expressions (40)
and (39) represents the optimal contract when γSBPb < γ < min
	
γSBA3, γSBPb


, where
γSBA3 ≡ ν(1−µ)∆θ(2ν(1−µ)−µ∆θ(1−2ν))
γSBPb ≡ ∆θ(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))(νµ∆θ+2(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν)))
.
(ii) Separation and exclusion of type HL when ability prevails and ICHHvsLL and PCLL are
binding. A solution to the principal’s program SB with exclusion of type HL and ICHHvsLL and PCLL
binding and with eﬀort levels described by expressions from (40) to (42) represents the optimal contract
only if γSBA3 < γSBPb and γSBA3 ≤ γ < γSBPb.
Result 11(i) describes precisely the same pooling equilibrium obtained in Case M and Case A.2.
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D.3.3 Proof of Remark 9
Consider the contracts with full separation and full participation in Cases M and A.3 and let ∆θ be the
same in the two situations.32
Expected informational rents paid by the principal in Case M are higher than in Case A.3 if and only
if
µνuMLH + µ (1− ν)uMHH + ν (1− µ)uMLL > µνuA3LH + µ (1− ν)uA3HH + ν (1− µ)uA3LL,
where uHL is omitted from both sides because it is equal to zero. A suﬃcient condition for the above
inequality to hold is that uMij ≥ uA3ij for every type of worker ij, with at least one strict inequality, where
the actual expressions for informational rents appear in the wages given by (10) to (12) for Case M and
by (14) to (16) for Case A.3.
Now, uMLH > u
A3
LH holds if and only if
1
2 (θ − 1)

eMHH
2 − 12 (θ − 1) eMLL2 + γeMLL + 12 (θ − 1) eMHL2 > γeA3LL + 12 (θ − 1) eA3HL2 .
Given that 12 (θ − 1)

eMHH
2 − 12 (θ − 1) eMLL2 is always positive in Case M and that eMHL = eA3HL, a
suﬃcient condition for the above inequality to hold is simply that eMLL > e
A3
LL which is indeed the case.
Moreover, uMHH > u
A3
HH if and only if
−12 (θ − 1) e2LL + γeLL + 12 (θ − 1) e2HL > −12 (θ − 1) e2LL + γeLL + 12 (θ − 1) e2HL .
Since eMHL = e
A3
HL one can simplify the above inequality as
−12 (θ − 1)

eMLL + e
A3
LL
 
eMLL − eA3LL

+ γ

eMLL − eA3LL

> 0
and, being eMLL > e
A3
LL, one can further simply it as
eMLL + e
A3
LL <
2γ
∆θ
.
Substituting for the expressions of eMLL and e
A3
LL, the latter condition is equivalent to
γ > (θ−1)(1−µ)(2µ+2ν−2θµ−3µν+θµν)
(2µ+2ν−2θµ−6µν+2θµν−3µ2+4θµ2+4µ2ν−2θµ2ν−θ2µ2)
≡ γLL .
Note that γLL < γ
SBA3 always holds so eMLL+ e
A3
LL <
2γ
∆θ is always satisﬁed when both Cases M and A.3
are relevant.
Finally, uMLL = u
A3
LL because uLL =
1
2 (θ − 1) e2HL and again eMHL = eA3HL.
32 It is always the case that min

θ
M
1 , θ
M
2

< θ
A3
but there is a wide range of probabilities µ < 1
2
and ν such that
θA3 < min

θ
M
1 , θ
M
2

, meaning that the two subsets of θ are at least partially overlapping.
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D.4 Pooling between intermediate types HH and LL
Suppose that the principal oﬀers a single contract to both agents LL and HH. Then one has eLL =
eHH = ep and wLL = wHH = wp. The relevant constraints are
wLH − 1
2
e2LH + γeLH ≥ wp −
1
2
e2p + γep
for type LH,
wp − 1
2
e2p ≥ wHL −
1
2
e2HL (44)
for type LL or
wp − 1
2
θe2p + γep ≥ wHL −
1
2
θe2HL + γeHL (45)
for type HH. Finally, for type HL
wHL − 1
2
θe2HL ≥ 0.
The binding participation constraint is the one of typeHL above, while all other participation constraints
are satisﬁed provided that PCHL is. The monotonicity condition
eLH ≥ ep ≥ eHL
holds; but which incentive compatibility constraint between (44), that is ICLLvsHL, and (45), or else
ICHHvsHL, binds ﬁrst? Taking into account the binding participation constraint of type HL, it must be
that
wp ≥ max

1
2
θe2p − γep + γeHL;
1
2
e2p +
1
2
∆θe2HL

.
Thus, ICHHvsHL is binding ﬁrst when
1
2
θe2p − γep + γeHL ≥
1
2
e2p +
1
2
∆θe2HL ⇐⇒ ep + eHL ≥
2γ
∆θ
,
whereas ICLLvsHL is binding when
1
2
θe2p − γep + γeHL ≤
1
2
e2p +
1
2
∆θe2HL ⇐⇒ ep + eHL ≤
2γ
∆θ
In what follows we study the two sub-cases separately.
D.4.1 Pooling between intermediate types with ICHHvsHL binding
Suppose that when pooling occurs, ICHHvsHL is binding while ICLLvsHL is slack. We call this situation
Case P (a). Then one has ep+ eHL ≥ 2γ∆θ . Wages must satisfy
wHL =
1
2
θe2HL, (46)
wp =
1
2
θe2p − γep +γeHL  
Info rent worker HH
, (47)
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and
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+
1
2
∆θe2p + γeHL  
Info rent worker LH
. (48)
The wage wp has the same expression as wHH in Cases A.1 and A.2 (see equation 27). Since ICHHvsHL
is binding while ICLLvsHL is not, we expect that the information rent of worker LL is higher than the
one of worker HH and this occurs for ep >
2γ
∆θ . This requirement is more restrictive than ep+ eHL ≥ 2γ∆θ
and it must be imposed ex-post, as was done in Case A.1.
Substituting again the wage schedules into the principal’s program we ﬁnd
eSBPaLH = 1 + γ,
eSBPap ≡ eSBA1p =
(ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν)) (1 + γ)
νµ∆θ + (ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν)) θ (49)
and
eSBPaHL =
(1− ν) (1− µ)− γ (1− (1− ν) (1− µ))
(1− ν) (1− µ) θ = e
SBA1
HL .
Note that eSBPaLH > e
SBPa
p and e
SBPa
LH > e
SBPa
HL always hold. Moreover e
SBPa
HL is the same as e
SBA1
HL
since in both cases participation constraint of worker HL is binding. Also observe that eSBPaHL is strictly
positive if and only if γ < γSBA11 , and e
SBPa
p > e
SBPa
HL if and only if
γ > νµ(1−ν)(1−µ)∆θ
νµ(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))∆θ+θ(µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ)) = γ
SBPa ,
where γSBPa < γSBA1 always holds. Moreover, eSBA1LL < e
SBPa
p < e
SBA1
HH if and only if γ > γ
SBA1
2 and
the condition ep >
2γ
∆θ holds if and only if
γ < (ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))∆θ2νµ∆θ+(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))(θ+1) = γ
SBPa
where γSBPa > γSBPa is always true, γSBPa < γSBA11 if and only if
θ < (ν(1−µ)(1−µ(1−ν))+µ(1−ν)(1−ν(1−µ)))
((2ν−1)(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))+2(1−ν)2µ2)
= θ5
(always for ν < 12 and µ <
(1−2ν)2+
√
(1−2ν)(1+2ν−4ν2)
4(1−ν)2
≡ µ3 < 12), where θ3 < θ5 < θ4 if and only if
µ < µ2, and γ
SBA1
3 < γ
SBPa < γSBA12 if and only if µ < µ2.
It is now possible to state the following result.
Result 12 (i) Full participation and Pooling between types HH and LL with ICHHvsHL bind-
ing. A solution to the principal’s program SB which entails full participation and pooling between types
HH and LL and ICHHvsHL binding, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eHH = eLL >
eHL > 0, and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (30), (33) and (49) exists if and
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only if γSBPa < γ < min

γSBA11 , γ
SBPa

with
γSBPa ≡ νµ(1−ν)(1−µ)∆θ
νµ(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))∆θ+θ(µ(1−ν)+ν(1−µ))
γSBPa ≡ (ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))∆θ2νµ∆θ+(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))(θ+1)
γSBA11 ≡ (1−ν)(1−µ)(1−(1−ν)(1−µ))
(ii) Pooling between types HH and LL with ICHHvsHL binding and exclusion of type HL.
A solution to the principal’s program SB which entails pooling between types HH and LL and PCHH
binding, exclusion of type HL and which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eHH = eLL > 0, and
which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (30) and (49) exists if and only if γ < γSBPa.
Note that in this Case P (a) it never happens that type HH is asked to provide an eﬀort which falls in
the range where her utility is increasing in eﬀort, namely it is never the case that eHH = eLL = e
SBPa
p <
γ
θ
.
This might occur in the subsequent Case P (b) .
D.4.2 Pooling between intermediate types with ICLLvsHL binding
Suppose now that when pooling occurs, ICLLvsHL is binding while ICHHvsHL is slack. We call this
situation Case P (b), in which ep + eHL ≤ 2γ∆θ . Wages must satisfy
wHL =
1
2
θe2HL,
wp =
1
2
e2p +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker LL
(50)
and
wLH =
1
2
e2LH − γeLH+γep +
1
2
∆θe2HL  
Info rent worker LH
.
Note that the wage wp now has the same expression as wLL in Case M (see equation 10), Case A.3 (see
equation 15) and Case A.2.
Substituting the wage schedules into the program and deriving yields
eSBPbLH = 1 + γ,
eSBPbp ≡ eSBMp = eSBA2p =
(ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν))− γµν
(ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν)) (51)
and
eSBPbHL =
(1− ν) (1− µ)
θ − (1− (1− ν) (1− µ)) = e
SBM
HL = e
SBA3
HL ,
where eSBPbHL is equal to e
SBM
HL and e
SBA3
HL since in all cases the incentive constraint ICLLvsHL is binding.
Note that eSBPbp > 0 if and only if
γ <
ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν)
µν
= γSBPb,
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which is always the case for µ < ν3ν−1 , and which is such that γ
SBPb > γ∗ if and only if θ < θ
M
1 and
such that γSBPb > γSBM and γSBPb > γSBA2 always hold. Furthermore, observe that eSBPbLH > e
SBPb
p
and eSBPbLH > e
SBPb
HL always hold, while e
SBPb
p > e
SBPb
HL holds whenever e
SBPb
p > 0 is true. Finally, the
condition eSBPbp + e
SBPb
HL ≤ 2γ∆θ holds if and only if
γ ≥ (ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))∆θ(∆θ+2(1−ν)(1−µ))(θ−(1−(1−ν)(1−µ)))(2(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))+µν∆θ) = γSBPb
where γSBPb < min

γ∗, γSBPb

is always true and where γSBA2 < γSBPb and γSBA3 < γSBPb < γSBA3
are also true.
Result 13 Full participation and Pooling between types HH and LL with ICLLvsHL binding.
A solution to the principal’s program SB which entails full participation and pooling between types HH
and LL and ICLLvsHL binding, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eHH = eLL > eHL > 0,
and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (17), (20) and (51) exists if and only if
γSBPb ≤ γ < γSBPb with
γSBPb ≡ (ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))∆θ(∆θ+2(1−ν)(1−µ))(θ−(1−(1−ν)(1−µ)))(2(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))+µν∆θ)
γSBPb ≡ ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν)
µν
Concerning exclusion of the worst type, we need to consider a similar program where, instead of
having ICLLvsHL binding and ICHHvsHL slack, we need PCLL to be binding and PCHH to be slack. In
this case, the requirement eSBPbp + eHL ≤ 2γ∆θ reduces to the more general condition eSBPbp ≤ 2γ∆θ , which
is satisﬁed if and only if
γ ≥ ∆θ (ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν))
(νµ∆θ + 2 (ν (1− µ) + µ (1− ν))) = γ
SBPb
where γSBPb < γSBPb.
Result 14 Pooling between types HH and LL with PCLL binding and exclusion of type HL.
A solution to the principal’s program SB which entails pooling between types HH and LL with PCLL
binding and exclusion of type HL, which satisﬁes the monotonicity condition eLH > eHH = eLL > 0,
and which is such that eﬀort levels are given by expressions (17) and (51) exists if and only if γSBPb ≤
γ < γSBPb with
γSBPb ≡ ∆θ(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))(νµ∆θ+2(ν(1−µ)+µ(1−ν))) .
For further reference note that γSBPb is smaller than γSBA2 provided that θ ≤ 2, namely provided
that Assumption 2 holds.
Also note that it might eventually be the case that eHH = eLL = e
SBPb
p <
γ
θ
in which situation type
HH would have incentive to provide more eﬀort than the one required by her optimal contract since the
required eﬀort falls in the range in which her indiﬀerence curve is downward sloping in the space (e,w) .
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E Example
Let γL = 0 and γH = γ ∈ (0, 1] and let θL = 1 and θH = θ ∈ (1, 2]. Assume that motivation and skills
are uniformly distributed across workers, so that µ = ν = 12 . Case M is attained for 1 < θ <
3
2 , Case
A.2 does not exist, while Case A.3 holds for 53 < θ ≤ 2. Hence one can have three classes of problems:
(i) the diﬀerence in ability is low and 1 < θ < 32 , and either motivation prevails and Case M is attained
or ability prevails and Case A.1 holds; (ii) the diﬀerence in ability is high and 53 < θ ≤ 2, ability always
prevails and either Case A.1 or Case A.3 hold depending on the value taken by γ; (iii) the diﬀerence in
ability is intermediate so that 32 ≤ θ ≤ 53 , ability prevails and only Case A.1 holds.
In situation (i) , one observes the following optimal contracts: when 0 < γ ≤ ∆θ3(2θ−1) = γSBA1 the
principal oﬀers a pooling contract to low-skilled types HH and HL, when γSBA1 < γ < γSBA1 =
γSBA13 =
∆θ
3θ−1 full participation and full separation under Case A.1 is implemented, when γ
SBA1 ≤ γ <
γSBPa = ∆θ2θ the principal oﬀers a pooling contract to intermediate types HH and LL, which is such that
ICHHvsHL is binding, when γ
SBPa ≤ γ < γSBPb = 2∆θ
θ+3 there is exclusion of both types HH and HL,
when γSBPb < γ < γSBPb = 4(2θ−1)∆θ(4θ−3)(θ+3) there is pooling between intermediate types HH and LL with
the constraint ICLLvsHL binding and exclusion of type HL. Note that γ
SBPb < γ∗ so that we still are in
the domain in which ability prevails and eLL > eHH . When γSBPb ≤ γ ≤ γSBM = 4∆θ2θ+1 we have pooling
between intermediate types HH and LL with the constraint ICLLvsHL binding but full participation
is attained, and we cross γ∗ so that motivation prevails and eHH > eLL. When γSBM < γ <
3∆θ
4θ−3 =
γSBM < 12 , full separation and full participation is attained under Case M. When γ
SBM ≤ γ < 1 the
principal oﬀers a pooling contract to non-motivated types LL and HL.
In situation (ii) , one observes the following: when 0 < γ < γSBPb there are the same optimal contracts
as in (i) , when γSBPb ≤ γ < γSBA3 = (3θ−1)∆θ2(4θ−3) we have pooling between intermediate types HH and
LL with the constraint ICLLvsHL binding and full participation, when γ
SBA3 < γ < γSBA3 = 2∆θ
θ+2 there
is full participation and full separation under Case A.3, when γSBA3 ≤ γ ≤ 1, we have full participation
and pooling between intermediate types HH and LL with the constraint ICLLvsHL binding.
In situation (iii) , one observes the following optimal contracts: when 0 < γ < γSBPb there are the
same solutions as in (i) and (ii) , when γSBPb ≤ γ < 1 we have full participation and pooling between
intermediate types HH and LL with the constraint ICLLvsHL binding.
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Figure 2c. Case A.3 (eHH <eLL): 
eLL +eHL < 2γ/∆θ < eLL +eHH  
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Figure 2b. Case A.2 (eHH <eLL): 
eHH +eHL < 2γ/∆θ < eLL +eHL. 
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Figure 2a. Case A.1 (eHH <eLL): 
2γ/∆θ < eHH +eHL. 
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Figure 1. Case M (eHH >eLL):  
2γ/∆θ > eHH +eLL. 
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Figure 3. Existing classes of equilibria as a function of  2γ/∆θ. 
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Figure 4. Equilibria with pooling and/or exclusion of some workers’ types as a function of  γ. 
 
